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Analyzing Volatility and Policy Changes in the Financial Market:
Three Essays in Applied Finance
By
Rebecca Bommarito
Claremont Graduate University: 2021
Volatility in financial markets make forecasting, or in other words estimating what will
happen in the future, a difficult task. Too often forecasts are made but hardly ever revisited
to see how accurate the forecast was and if not, why? The three chapters of my dissertation
are focused on examining volatility in financial markets from changes in investors’ trading
behavior as well as studying the characteristics of forecast error of various financial securities.
Often, the accuracy of these forecasts rely on the estimates made for future volatility.
In my first chapter, we1 analyze the predictive power of the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM)
model on a data set of options on the SPDR SP 500 Trust ETF (SPY). We leverage the
full options chain to analyze the full forecasted distribution of prices through N(d2), which
we compare to the distribution of prices of SPY. Using non-parametric GOF tests, such as
the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and Anderson-Darling tests, we are able to analyze whether two
different distributions come from the same underlying population distribution. We find that
BSM tends to overestimate the tails in the implied probability distribution when further away
in expiration, compared to the empirical price path of SPY. The resulting comparison gives
way to visualizing and testing the ability for the BSM to predict the likelihood of options
expiring in-the-money. Our findings suggest the BSM, in most cases, correctly estimates
the underlying risk adjusted probabilities only a few days out from expiration, which may
be attributed to the uncertainty in traders to foresee market movements until an option is
close to expiration. However, this behavior is more pronounced during crisis periods, where
the BSM tends to correctly estimate the likelihood of tail events occurring more often than
during periods of market normalcy.
In my second chapter, my co-authors and I2 study the characteristics of error in economic
forecasts over time. We focus on explaining the variation errors of the survey of professional
economic forecasts (SPF) across three financial securities by isolating the effects of changes
in fiscal and monetary policy as well as changes in various macroeconomic indicators. We
1This is joint work with Nasser Khalil, Clemens Kownatzki and Hisam Sabouni
2This is joint work with Hisam Sabouni
examine if it is changes in government policy or changes in macroeconomic indicators (or
market conditions) that is primarily responsible for increases in SPF forecast error. We use a
principal component analysis to first perform orthogonal dimension reduction of our macroe-
conomic indicator variables and use the first two principal components as an overall measure
for market conditions. We then use a linear regression to test whether market conditions or
monetary and/or fiscal policy is primarily responsible for increases in SPF forecast error of
three securities’ yields: the three month Treasury bill, Moody’s AAA corporate bond and
the Ten year Treasury bill. We find increases in monetary policy via the EFFR affects the
short-term security in our analysis to a large magnitude, but increases in overall market
conditions affect all securities in our analysis to a smaller but significant degree.
In my third chapter, I explore an anomaly that exists in the U.S. equity market that has
not been documented before; investors’ reactions to earnings announcements are not only
asymmetric, but seasonal. Knowing which months experience larger variation than others,
investors may incorporate financial derivatives such an options to hedge downside risk. Using
a fixed effects linear regression, I first examine the effect an earnings beat and earnings miss
have on abnormal returns; which are calculated by a CAPM-GARCH model. I find an
earnings beat on average has large significant increases in firms’ abnormal returns while an
earnings miss, or a negative earnings surprise, has limited downside impacts. Examining this
effect further at the month level, I find investor’s reactions are extremely large to earnings
beats announced in months June and to earnings misses announced in December compared
to other months.
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1 Chapter 1: Analyzing the Predictive Power of Black-
Scholes
Coauthored with Nasser Khalil, Clemens Kownatzki and Hisam Sabouni
1.1 Introduction
For some time, economists have utilized options pricing models, such as the Black-Scholes
Merton (BSM) model, to not only estimate an option’s fair value, but to forecast the volatility
of the underlying asset derived from the implied volatility in options. One way to examine
this is to back out of BSM what the option is “implying” about the underlying future
expected volatility, also known as “implied volatility”. The price of an option is dependent
on the breadth of possible scenarios that may occur over the life of an option. Much of the
attraction of the BSM model has been on modeling the risk and sensitivity of the options
price of the underlying security. A natural product of the BSM, however, is the underlying
risk-adjusted probabilities used to price options. With an options chain, probabilities are
assigned as to the likelihood the underlying asset will be above the strike price at expiration.
Little, if any research, has focused on the implications of risk-adjusted probabilities derived
by the BSM model and the weight given to “deep-in’ and “out of’ the money contracts. Our
analysis aims to address the insights provided by the market expectations of risk adjusted
probabilities as backed out by the BSM, and the ability to forecast whether an option will
expire in the-money.
During market crashes and large price swings, increases in volatility tend to suggest a
higher likelihood of tail events occurring. Canonical models, such as that of Merton (1973)
and Black and Scholes (1973) highlight the relative importance of volatility in determining
the price of an option. In this paper, we seek to examine the forecasting abilities of Black-
Scholes, and examine how fast the implied distribution of BSM adjusts to changes in prices
and thus affects the accuracy of the forecast. As individuals’ perceptions of volatility change
over time, the price of options can vary dramatically. Kownatzki and Sabouni (2019) show
options have an extra insurance premium and thus options prices are inflated relative to
what we would observe based on historical volatility of the underlying assets. Put options
have slightly higher levels of implied volatility because prices fall faster than they rise3,
resulting in a higher demand for put options to hedge downside risk. Professional option
3Kownatzki and Sabouni (2019) present the case of option an options strangle strategy suffering from
deep losses from a maximum drawdown during crisis periods.
1
traders, as a result, may be aware that option prices are inflated relative to what is observed
in the market, resulting in the net selling of options. This notion suggests that in periods
of market normalcy, options tend to overestimate the likelihood of exercise at expiration. In
most cases, implied volatility is highest in options with strike prices further away from the
current market price. Furthermore, options expire and become worthless if they are out-
of-the-money. Typically, longer-dated options have lower levels of implied volatility when
short-dated volatility is low. Our analysis focuses on documenting how the BSM model
assigns risk adjusted probabilities to these phenomena.
Deriving the implied volatility from BSM can provide significant benefits to investors,
such as providing an estimate of the future variability for the assets underlying their options
contract. Implied volatility provides a more robust estimate of risk compared to using
historical data. Option sensitivity to changes in implied volatility, or vega4, for at the-money
option prices is greater than in the-money or out-the-money options Poon and Granger
(2003). Therefore, implied volatility estimates are derived from strike prices for ITM, ATM,
and OTM options on heavily traded securities, and is used as an alternative measure of risk
compared to historical volatility. Alternatively, research has centered on observing the VIX
(S&P 500 Volatility Index) as an overall barometer of market risk using a weighted average
of implied volatility.
Much of the previous literature surrounding implied volatility from BSM utilize point
estimates, which acts as an estimate of expected future volatility of an options contract
Fleming (1998). In this analysis, we model the reverse cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of N(d2) 60/90/120/180 days5 from expiration for call and puts separately. We track
each and every option traded on the SPY every day from each of our respective start periods
until the expiration of the options. A novel contribution of this paper is that we utilize
the full options chain to analyze the full forecasted distribution (density forecast) of prices
through N(d2) from the initial transaction date all the way to expiration. Until recently, most
forecasts were provided as point estimates, with measures of uncertainty, such as standard
errors, included. Recent trends include forecasters providing density or interval forecasts
along with their point forecasts. Density forecasts are more universal than point forecasts
as they provide information on the full forecasted distribution of a random variable. The
availability of density forecasts allow users to focus on specific moments of the distribution
that are of interest (such as the predicted mean, median, quantile, etc.), depending on the
4See Figure 11 for a detailed look at the behavior of vega across various degrees of moneyness.
5Here, 120 and 180 DTE are double the amount of 60 to 90, respectively. Therefore, 120 and 180 DTE
provide double the amount of information and data needed to analyze various sub-periods in our sample.
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user’s specific loss function by which the forecast is evaluated. Since density forecasts contain
all probabilistic information about the random variable, every user’s needs will be satisfied,
regardless of the loss function6. Our paper analyzes the evolution of the distribution of N(d2)
over time, which demonstrates the change in how investors implicitly assign probabilities to
the likelihood that an option will expire in the-money. This dynamic is represented by a
change in the shape of the curve as an options chain approaches maturity. By observing the
similarity between the underlying price path and implied probability distribution, investors
are better able to assess which possible strike prices are more likely to fall in-the-money at
expiration. Closer to expiration, options that are closest to the underlying spot price are
assigned greater probabilities of being profitable. The uncertainty in the likelihood of an
option expiring in the-money is partly demonstrated by the same behavior exhibited in the
volatility smile. Farther from expiration, there is considerable uncertainty in deep in and
out-the money options. Our interest is in observing this shift in uncertainty during market
crashes or black swan events, where uncertainty is at its highest 7. Rather than focusing on
risk measures such as implied volatility, we utilize these events in the context of changing
risk-adjusted probabilities of N(d2). The probability measure of N(d2) provides us with a
forecast of what the underlying price distribution may look like at expiration, rather than
observing a point estimate of implied volatility.
By observing unique expiration dates in a sample of data, we are able to observe and
compare how risk-adjusted probabilities are assigned as to the likelihood of an option expiring
in the money. We estimate the cumulative distribution of an options chain across time prior
to expiration to analyze how well the distribution predicts the underlying price path of an
underlying security. Increasingly, comparisons not only include the means of two samples,
but entire distributions. Aıt-Sahalia et al. (2001) apply a similar study to S&P 500 index
to compare the distribution of risk neutral probability measures on the underlying index
returns, but find that the two distributions differ substantially. Our approach differs from
Aıt-Sahalia et al. (2001) in that we observe probability measures, implicitly, from the BSM,
rather than a non-parametric model of options prices. It is then possible to ask whether
the two samples have identical or different distributions, and whether the distributions differ
at the median (or specified quantile) and/or whether the CDFs differ at a particular value.
6In a specific case, if the user’s loss function depends not only on the point forecast, but on a two-sided
prediction-interval, or even the entire density (i.e., the loss function is a scoring-rules), a density forecast is
favorable to a point forecast.
7Peak volatility in the market can also be seen by the behavior of the VIX, which is the implied risk of
the overall market (S&P 500 Index).
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One way to compare two distributions is to use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) (1939) two
sample non-parametric GOF test, which tests if two different distributions come from the
same underlying population distribution.
Another test similar to the K-S test is the Anderson–Darling (A-D) (1952) Scholz and
Stephens (1987) two sample non-parametric GOF test. These two tests differ only slightly in
where the majority of the power lies; the center or the tails of the distribution. The K-S test
tends to be more sensitive near the center of the distribution, while the A-D test tends to be
more sensitive near the tails. Comparing the empirical CDF of the price path relative to the
predicted risk-adjusted probabilities allows for a quantitative analysis of how similar both
probability curves evolve over time. The proceeding paper addresses the comparison between
the risk-adjusted probability measures provided by the BSM model, and an empirical CDF
of historical prices on the underlying option.
Since theta decay accelerates exponentially as we approach expiration, this then causes
the distribution of risk adjusted probabilities to collapse towards a narrower set of possible
price paths. We show that this holds true not only for the implied BSM distribution compared
to the actual distribution, but also when comparing the implied distribution of BSM to a
Monte Carlo simulation of implied probability estimates. While the Monte Carlo randomly
iterates/changes as the option gets closer to expiration, it more or less stays similar in shape
(an S curve) to the BSM implied distribution; both far and close to expiration. Overall,
the Monte Carlo simulation is closer to the true distribution when it is further away from
expiration. Our analyses also observe periods in which the BSM is able to correctly predict
the underlying price path of SPY. We contribute to the existing literature surrounding
options by observing the full distribution of option chains across time, and assessing the
forecasting ability of the market expectations backed out from the BSM in determining risk
adjusted probabilities.
1.2 Methods
The contribution of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) and their development of
the BSM model provides an analytical framework for observing the evolution of European8
option prices. Inputs from BSM provide useful insights into the behavior of options, and
the underlying asset associated with the option. The BSM model assumes the option is
8Although we are using American options for our analysis on SPY, the differences between the two option
types stems from the options price and ability of early exercise in American options. For a further discussion,
see the Appendix.
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European and can only be exercised at expiration, no dividends are paid out during the life
of the option, no transaction costs, markets are efficient (i.e., market movements cannot be
predicted) and assumes constant values for risk free rate of return. Lastly, BSM model as-
sumes the price of the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant
drift and volatility over the option duration. We relax the assumption of the traditional
BSM framework in assuming, in the case of SPY, that dividends are non-zero. The following
modified equations provide the underlying BSM model, adjusting for the addition of divi-
dends in the model:
Call = S0e
−qTN(d1)−Ke−rTN(d2) (1)












d2 = d1 − σ
√
T (4)
where, S0 is the spot price of the underlying security, q is the continuously compounded
dividend yield, N(·) represents the cumulative normal distribution, K is the strike price of
the option, r is the risk-free rate, σ is the volatility of the underlying security, and T is the
time to expiration expressed in years. The first/second term StN(d1) for a call/put option is
the product of the discounted expected value of the stock price at maturity; conditional that
S > K or S < K at maturity for a given Prob(S > K) or Prob(S < K) at maturity. N(d1)
assumes that the option will expire in-the-money and then determines the probability of a
particular in-the-money stock price. The second/first term, Ke−rTN(d2), is the discounted
exercise price times the probability the terminal stock price exceeds the exercise price. N(d2)
equals the probability that the call/put will finish in the money in a risk-free world.
A main drawback of the BSM is the assumption of constant volatility across an options
chain. This assumption is not reflected in the real world where different strike prices have
different levels of implied volatility reflecting the fact that investors and traders assign higher
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premiums for options that allow them to protect their portfolios. Although BSM assumes
a log-normal distribution (Gaussian Distribution) of price changes for the underlying asset,
prices can have a larger skewness and kurtosis; meaning that high risk downward moves
occur more often in the options market than a Gaussian distribution predicts. Due to the
assumptions of a log-normal distribution on the underlying asset prices, implied volatility is
quite similar across strikes according to BSM 9 . While the 1987 stock market crash had little
change in observable macroeconomic fundamentals, market prices fell 20-25% and interest
rates dropped about 1-2%. Due to this, market makers changed their assumptions about
volatility being equally spread between out/in/at the-money options, which led to a shift
in the prices market makers were willing to deal at; triggering a permanent shift in index
option prices. Since the 1987 market crash, implied volatility for at the-money options have
been lower than those far out the-money or far in the-money options. The Black-Scholes
formula has been significantly under pricing short-maturity, deep out of the-money S&P 500
put options, revealing implied volatility values form a convex curve along the strike prices
(Rubinstein (1994), Bates (2000)). The reason for this occurrence is that the market prices in
a higher likelihood of a sharp downward price movement than an increase. It also means put
options have higher implied volatility than call options since prices fall faster than they rise.
This has led to the presence of the volatility skew. When the implied volatility for options
with the same expiration date are mapped out on a graph, a smile or skew shape can be
seen. Another way to view this is to observe for low strike prices, the underlying spot price
is already in the-money for a given options chain. The probability that the option will expire
in the-money at expiration is fairly high for deep in the-money contracts, and significantly
smaller for deep out-the-money contracts. It is also possible to have reverse volatility smile if
the implied volatility is higher on lower options strikes relative to the current market price.
These are most commonly seen in index options or other longer-term options and occurs
at times when investors are uncertain about the future and purchase puts to hedge their
position.
Options are priced with expected future volatility. Instead of backing out implied volatil-
ity from the BSM, we instead calibrate the BSM using inputs, provided by our data set, to
find N(d2). We first start by calculating the probability of exercise by using data on delta,
which can be expressed for call10 options as:
9The same assumptions don’t hold for implied volatility on strikes farther from the underlying market
price. Instead, there is a non-linear increase in implied volatility.
10Whereas for puts, delta is calculated as N(d1)− 1.
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∆ = N(d1) (5)
We apply11 the inverse of the normal distribution to Equation 5, and are left with a value
for d1. Hence, we are then able to apply Equation 4 to calculate N(d2). For each trading
day and unique options expiration, we apply this procedure for a complete options chain.
Likewise, for each day and expiration, an implied cumulative distribution of probabilities
is formed across all strike prices. Given that this is a probabilistic forecast, most of the
probability density remains close to the strike price, which looks similar to a bell curve. The
same process is repeated for every sample options chain dating back 60/90/120/180 days
from expiration, which then allows us to observe any possible patterns that may arise for
an options chain of calls or puts at for a given expiration date. The focus of the paper is to
observe the risk-adjusted probability measure of N(d2) and N(−d2) for call and put options,
respectively, of an option being exercised. Across an options chain, we are able to construct,
from the BSM framework, a cumulative distribution function of N(d2) (or N(−d2)). Using
implied probability12 and number of days until maturity, we apply equation 4 to calculate
d2 and market expectations of probability measure N(d2).
As described earlier, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 13 (K-S) (1939) is a two sample non-





Equation 6 represents the two-sample KS test statistic, where F (t) and G(t) are two
sample distributions to test for the null hypothesis of F (t) = G(t). In our analysis, we
use the cumulative distribution of N(d2) (N(−d2) for puts) to compare to the empirical
distribution of realized stock prices during the forecasted option period.
The K-S test is based on the empirical distribution function (ECDF). Given N ordered
data points Y1, Y2, ..., YN , the ECDF is defined as
11Although ∆ of a call is equal to N(d1) in the case of a non-dividend paying stock, we assume the
difference in calculating delta for dividend paying equities to be negligible. For the purposes of our study,
Equation 5 holds for low dividend yielding equities such as SPY.
12We note here that implied volatility values are provided in the data set from IVolatility.com, which
utilizes a 100 step binomial tree to create these estimates. For a further explanation, see the Appendix.
13See Lehmann and Romano (2006) for a further look at the application of the KS test for one or two
sample comparisons.
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EN = n(i)/N (7)
where n(i) is the number of points less than Yi and the Yi are ordered from smallest to
largest value. This is a step function that increases by 1/N at the value of each ordered data
point.
An attractive feature of this test is that the distribution of the K-S test statistic itself
does not depend on the underlying cumulative distribution function being tested; it is non-
parametric. A second advantage is that it is an exact test; it does not depend on an adequate
sample size for the estimates to be valid. Despite these positive features, the K-S test does
suffer from a few limitations. The K-S test tends to be more sensitive near the center of the
distribution than at the tails. The variance of the sample CDF in the tails is smaller than
near the median. That is, it is “harder” to achieve the critical value of D in the tail region
than in the middle, so the test generally finds deviations more toward the middle than right
up at the ends.
An alternative to the K-S test is the Anderson-Darling (A-D) (1952) (Stephens 1974)
test for normality which gives more weight to the tails than the K-S test and also uses
information from all of the differences, not just the largest one. An extension of the A-D test
comes in the form of a K-sample test, which can be used to test whether several collections
of random distributions can be modeled as coming from the similar continuous populations.









where n and m are the sample sizes of the two random distributions of Fn(x) and Gm(x),




test takes the weighted average of each sample observation, and takes the squared sum
difference between the two distributions. This approach differs significantly from the K-
S test, where the largest point wise difference is used as a critical value for comparing
distributions. Similarly to the K-S test, the K-sample A-D test is non-parametric goodness
of fit measure. The A-D test makes use of the specific distribution in calculating critical
values, which has the advantage of allowing a more sensitive test, but the disadvantage that
critical values must be calculated for each distribution. For robustness, we use both the K-S
statistic and A-D statistic to compare the empirical distribution of a given options chain to
the actual.
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The K-S and A-D test are the main GOF tests we apply to compare distributions of
risk-adjusted probabilities from the BSM, and empirical CDF of SPY price path. Such an
approach is instrumental in assessing a goodness of fit measure to our analysis, and the
predictive power of the BSM. The risk-adjusted probabilities from the BSM forecasts the
likelihood an option will expire in the-money, at each point in time prior to expiration. That
is, prior to expiration, estimates how well the BSM predicts the empirical distribution of SPY
prior to expiration. The K-S test is first applied to a sample expiration date on a call and
put options chains, separately, for SPY. We proceed to test the similarity in distributions
of N(d2) from the BSM at each point in time, 180/120/90/60 days prior to expiration.
From the 180/120/90/60 day sample period prior to expiration, we create an empirical CDF
(ECDF) using the spot price of SPY. For each point in time, all possible strike prices of the
options chain act as inputs into the empirical distribution function. The same process can
be repeated for each unique option expiration date.
1.3 Data
From the period of January 2005 to December 2020, data is obtained from iVolatility on
the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPY)14. Data is obtained for American15 style options
on SPY as a baseline measure for the analysis, which includes the underlying closing spot
price, estimates of the Greeks, implied volatility, volume and open interest of traded option
contracts, and the number of days until expiration. We outline the Greeks for call and put
options in Table 12 by calculating the mean across a range of moneyness. Table 10 and 11
summarize the average implied volatility differential, which we calculate as the difference of
implied volatility from the closest at-the-money contract in an options chain. For deep out-
the-money puts and deep in-the-money calls, the implied volatility differential peaks during
recessionary periods.
The use of SPY options contracts is an ideal barometer of market activity, and has a high
degree of open interest, variety of strike prices and maturities16. Tables 1 and 15 provide an
average measure of activity in SPY options through open interest, and liquidity measured
by the bid-ask spread. Open interest represents the number of contracts that have yet to
be exercised or offset. Shorter dated options, up to 90 days to expiration, have a greater
14We chose 2005 as a start date given that there is very little options data available prior to this.
15Although BSM assumptions rely on the ability not to exercise the option early, American options can
still be approximated by this framework. For a further discussion, see the Appendix.
16Note: a substantial amount of time in our sample is plagued by artificially low interest rates as a result
of the monetary stimulus following the financial crises in 2008.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for SPY Call Options
Range of Days to Expiration
0 to 60 60 to 90 90 to 120 120 to 180
Mean Length of Strikes 77 85 86 83
Unique Number of Contracts 78,805 21,063 17,483 13,787
Mean Open Interest by K/S0
Less than 0.85 618 497 592 581
0.85 to 0.95 2,682 2,747 2,445 2,337
0.95 to 1.05 10,508 11,650 7,582 6,428
1.05 to 1.15 9,165 10,989 8,105 7,359
Greater than 1.15 5,029 4,222 3,612 3,176
Mean Bid-Ask Spread by K/S0
Less than 0.85 0.3681 0.3596 0.4087 0.4119
0.85 to 0.95 0.2855 0.1869 0.2057 0.2313
0.95 to 1.05 0.0654 0.0682 0.0906 0.1238
1.05 to 1.15 0.0536 0.0338 0.0579 0.0862
Greater than 1.15 0.1625 0.0305 0.0566 0.0605
Note: We introduce summary statistics on the sampled data for SPY call options contracts.
The first descriptive stat shows the average number of strike prices within an options chains.
We also count the number of unique contracts within the sample, which is shown in the second
row. The remaining rows illustrate liquidity and market activity in call options contracts,
by taking the average open interest and bid-ask spread for a given range of moneyness.
number of long positions across a range of moneyness, which is also evident by the number
of outstanding contracts 60 to days to expiration. Note, however, that the number of strike
prices in an options chain decreases towards a shorter range of days of expiration, suggesting
deeper in the-money and out the-money have fewer long positions in the underlying asset.
As an option approaches expiration, more contracts are created for strike prices that were
previously not offered in an options chain. Increases in the bid-ask spread for both SPY call
and put options are reflective of those options moving deeper in-the-money, and where less
active trading occurs.
Our analysis excludes observations for options that have zero open interest, as no active
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for SPY Put Options
Range of Days to Expiration
0 to 60 60 to 90 90 to 120 120 to 180
Mean Length of Strikes 86 100 99 93
Unique Number of Contracts 87,915 24,838 20,049 15,491
Mean Open Interest by K/S0
Less than 0.85 8,272 6,962 6,373 6,236
0.85 to 0.95 17,775 17,367 11,963 10,632
0.95 to 1.05 13,196 12,764 7,946 6,388
1.05 to 1.15 3,629 2,492 2,390 2,093
Greater than 1.15 1,875 1,333 1,178 915
Mean Bid-Ask Spread by K/S0
Less than 0.85 0.016 0.023 0.030 0.045
0.85 to 0.95 0.019 0.035 0.046 0.071
0.95 to 1.05 0.080 0.078 0.092 0.120
1.05 to 1.15 0.437 0.302 0.337 0.330
Greater than 1.15 0.702 0.503 0.592 0.638
Note: We introduce summary statistics on the sampled data for SPY put options contracts.
The first descriptive stat shows the average number of strike prices within an options chains.
We also count the number of unique contracts within the sample, which is shown in the second
row. The remaining rows illustrate liquidity and market activity in put options contracts,
by taking the average open interest and bid-ask spread for a given range of moneyness.
trading occurs in these contracts. SPY options contracts are initialized many days 17 out
from expiration, and allows for a more expansive data set to observe the changes to the
shape of our estimated probability distribution. We implement the analysis of distributional
similarity for a range of options contracts with days to expiration between 0 to 180 days,
and hence exclude contracts with longer expiration dates. A distinction is made here with
regards to how ‘days to expiration’ is denoted in our sample; data provided by iVolatility
measures days to expiration in terms of calendar days, rather than trading days. We apply
17Expiration can occur well over a year from when an options contract or chain is initialized.
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Equation 9 to calculate an approximate18 length of trading days based on calendar days of
60/90/120/180, where Int takes the closest integer of the inner bracket. To accommodate
for market closures during holidays, we subset for options chains with expiration lengths of
at least 40/60/80/120 trading days for a sample of 60/90/120/180 calendar days.






The filtered data is used to generate the full probability distribution of price ranges dating
back an n number of days, observing the empirical distribution to the actual for a given
options chain. Our sample consists of 14,466,550 observations, 203,474 unique contracts,
and across 1,028 unique option expiration dates for both put and call option chains. For
our analysis, we observe options chains 60/90/120/180 calendar days out from expiration to
observe the distribution of probability measure N(d2). The theoretical distribution of N(d2)
provided by the observed option chains on either call or puts, at a given point in time prior
to expiration, can be compared to the empirical distribution of the underlying SPY closing
price.
As an example, we take an initial look at the observed prices for a sample options chain
which expires on 2012-11-16. Figure 1 displays the empirical CDF of the price path relative to
the predicted risk-adjusted probabilities as of 2012-10-05, 42 days before expiration. Through
N(d2) we back out the red and blue lines for call and put options. The red and blue lines are
a snapshot in time. The green line is the observed time period of the actual price path; it
shows how far actual prices have moved in the last 42 days of this particular option chain’s
life. We aim to compare how well the market expectations as backed out by the BSM is able
to predict the underlying price path distribution of SPY (green line of Figure 1) using the
estimated values of N(d2) of an options chain. As we get closer to expiration, the time value
in option prices decreases exponentially; also known as theta decay. This is because there is
less time/less probability of the option to end up in the-money at expiration. From Figure
1, it is possible to see that options are pricing in outlier events too much. That is, BSM is
assigning larger probability density to tails to strike prices which are very unlikely to occur
in the market. For example, with St = 145 and K = 80, implied cumulative Prob(St > K)
≈ 100%, actual cumulative Prob(St > K) ≈ 92%. We expand upon this analysis by not
only observing the empirical CDF to the actual CDF on a random day before expiration,
18This formula does not fully account for all holidays within a given period of 60/90/120/180 days, when
the market may typically be closed.
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Figure 1: BSM Implied CDF versus Actual CDF
Note: The red line is the empirical CDF of the price path for put options and the blue line
is the empirical CDF of the price path for call options. The green line is the actual price
path for a randomly sampled options chain which expires on 2012-11-16. Therefore, the
red and blue lines are the the predicted risk-adjusted probabilities as of 2012-10-05, 42 days
prior to expiration. For each strike price, a corresponding point along the curves denotes
the estimated probability as of the time of measurement of the security surpassing the strike
price at the time of expiration.
but by observing these two distributions 60/90/120/180 days to expiration and every day
after until the option expires.
Figure 2 presents a sample 3D plot of the observed distribution of N(d2) from BSM
across 180 days for a call options chain that expires on 2005-12-16. The plot shows how the
distribution becomes more vertical closer to maturity. Closer to maturity, the possible price
path of where the option will likely expire becomes more apparent. Early in the life of the
option, we see a greater spread of risk adjusted probability measures across strike prices.
Deeper out of the money contracts have lower probability mass compared to options with
strike prices at or near the the underlying spot price. This suggests BSM is slow in adjusting
the predicted risk-adjusted probabilities for SPY.
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Figure 2: Observed distribution of N(d2)
Note: Two views of a sample 3D plot of the observed distribution of N(d2) from BSM across
180 days. Dates with more vertical distributions are closer to the true distribution, which
assigns less weight to for option contracts deep in and out of the money.
1.4 Results
For each unique options expiration date, we collect a sample of data points expanding
60/90/120/180 calendar days out from expiration. SPY prices are collected and used to
create an empirical distribution step function for each test, which we then use to input strike
prices from an options chain for each day. For each day prior to expiration, we bin the strike
prices of the options chain according to the empirical distribution of the sample period.
Hence, we form a forward ‘actual distribution’ of realized price outcomes for SPY as a base
comparison to the BSM. We then calculate N(d2), for each day, using the described method
in Section 3. Finally, we apply the non-parametric two sample K-S test, as described by
Equation 6, which finds the largest point-wise difference between the two CDF curves. The
p-value of the K-S test statistic, Dk(F,G), is tested against a 5% level of significance. If the
p-value is below 0.05, there is enough statistical evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
both samples come from the same underlying population distribution19. We repeat a similar
process for the A-D test, which differs from the K-S test in the location of power (comparing
the tails of the distribution). In essence, we test the similarity between the implied distri-
bution of BSM to the actual distribution using the prescribed goodness of fit measures from
Section 2. Our emphasis is placed on how well the BSM forecasts the forward distribution of
the underlying asset each day prior to expiration, and when we see the similarity occurring.
Figure 3 displays an extensive view of our research findings for option contracts that ex-
19Here, we assume both samples are log-normally distributed.
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Figure 3: Summary Results for 60/90/120/180 DTE
Note: The proportion of similarity between the implied BSM distribution and the actual dis-
tribution from 60/90/120/180 days to expiration. The x-axis is all unique option expiration
dates. The red(orange) line is the proportion of similarity for all call(put) option contracts
under the K-S test. The green(blue) line is the proportion of similarity for all call(put)
option contracts under the A-D test. Recessionary periods are highlighted in the gray scale
of the plot, and does not include the full recessionary period of the COVID-19 period.
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Table 3: Summary Results for Proportion of Similarity
(a) 60 DTE, N = 246
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
K-S Call 0 0.0227 0.0227 0.0433 0.0682 0.3182
K-S Put 0 0.0227 0.0455 0.0463 0.0682 0.2955
A-D Call 0 0.0227 0.0455 0.0580 0.0682 0.6591
A-D Put 0 0.0227 0.0682 0.0923 0.1364 0.6591
(b) 90 DTE, N = 230
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
K-S Call 0 0.0152 0.0152 0.0319 0.0455 0.1667
K-S Put 0 0.0152 0.0303 0.0327 0.0455 0.1364
A-D Call 0 0.0152 0.0303 0.0409 0.0606 0.1667
A-D Put 0 0.0152 0.0606 0.0642 0.0909 0.5000
(c) 120 DTE, N = 191
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
K-S Call 0 0 0.0116 0.0261 0.0349 0.4535
K-S Put 0 0 0.0116 0.0234 0.0349 0.3837
A-D Call 0 0.0116 0.0233 0.0300 0.0465 0.3023
A-D Put 0 0.0116 0.0349 0.0452 0.0698 0.5465
(d) 180 DTE, N = 133
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
K-S Call 0 0 0.0077 0.0189 0.0308 0.2923
K-S Put 0 0 0.0077 0.0166 0.0231 0.3231
A-D Call 0 0.0077 0.0077 0.0177 0.0231 0.1308
A-D Put 0 0.0077 0.0154 0.0269 0.0385 0.2462
Note: We summarize our results across each DTE, based on our sample of unique expiration
dates. Here, N represents the total number of sampled expiration dates for which we conduct
the GOF tests on. Using the proportion of similarity for each sampled expiration date, we
provide descriptive statistics for the output of our GOF tests.
pire within 60/90/120/180 days. In each sub-figure, the x-axis represents all unique option
expiration dates sorted for option contracts that expire within 60/90/120/180 days. The y-
axis represents the proportion of similarity between the two distributions, that is, the total
number of days we fail to reject the null hypothesis for the K-S or A-D test over the total num-
ber of DTE. We can then answer what proportion of the time, across 60/90/120/180 DTE,
did the forecasted BSM probability distribution statistically predict the actual probability
distribution. The red/yellow line in each sub-figure represent the proportion of similarity
under the K-S statistic for call/put options with 60/90/120/180 DTE. The green/blue line
in each figure represents the proportion of similarity under the A-D statistic for call/put
options with 60/90/120/180 DTE. We can see from each of the sub figures within Figure
3 that for most expiration dates there is a very low proportion of similarity between the
implied BSM distribution and the actual distribution.
Our results are summarized in Table 3, where we provide descriptive statistics for the
proportion of similarity based on the sampled expiration dates with 60/90/120/180 DTE.
We further extend our summary results in Table 4, where we take the average proportion
of similarity for each option type, GOF measure, and across each expiration year in our
sample. When looking at the difference in proportion of similarity between GOF tests as
well as between option types, a few interesting results arise. For call options, the K-S test
and A-D test show relatively equal proportions of similarity between the implied and actual
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distribution across unique expiration years. In contrast, the proportion of similarity for put
options differs substantially between the two GOF tests; the A-D test fails to reject the null
hypothesis more times than the K-S test. This is especially evident during the start of reces-
sionary periods, and in shorter expiration dates of 60 and 90 days. For periods of 120 and
180 DTE, the K-S test suggests more similarity in the actual and implied distribution during
the start of 2008. Notice, however, that the spike in proportional similarity occurs in the
early years of the 2008 crisis. This is seen for expiration dates midway 2008, when financial
markets began to decline and the VIX peaked. Downside exposure to price movements in
the S&P 500 during this period would suggest that the implied probability distribution of
put options are more similar to the underlying SPY price path than call options. Implied
volatility on options typically increase at the onset of recessionary periods, resulting in an
increase in option premiums and change in risk-adjusted probabilities. In the years following
the ’08 Financial Crisis, the proportion of similarity drops in comparison. This includes
the most recent COVID-19 crisis, where the K-S and A-D test find very little similarity
between the implied and actual distribution of SPY a part from a spike in the proportion of
similarity for options with longer expiration dates of 180 days. One main difference in our
results lies in the characterization of the two recessionary periods in our sample; the ’08-’09
period stemmed from a decline in the market value of financial assets, whereas the most
recent crisis was the result of a slowdown in economic activity during the shutdown of the
global economy. From Tables 10 and 11, the implied volatility differential has seen a steady
rise in the post ’08 crisis period. This may suggest that there is a negative correlation in
the steady rise in implied volatility differentials, and a lower forecasting ability in the BSM
implied probability distribution.
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Table 4: Mean Proportion of Similarity by Year
(a) 60 DTE
Year N KS Call KS Put AD Call AD Put
2005 10 0.059 0.075 0.064 0.205
2006 14 0.081 0.075 0.115 0.131
2007 15 0.055 0.058 0.077 0.092
2008 16 0.055 0.041 0.061 0.077
2009 16 0.064 0.061 0.06 0.091
2010 16 0.057 0.063 0.064 0.107
2011 16 0.04 0.055 0.058 0.102
2012 16 0.067 0.064 0.077 0.136
2013 16 0.043 0.064 0.064 0.128
2014 16 0.045 0.053 0.06 0.107
2015 16 0.028 0.026 0.04 0.063
2016 16 0.04 0.027 0.047 0.067
2017 16 0.034 0.04 0.054 0.071
2018 15 0.015 0.02 0.041 0.059
2019 16 0.016 0.023 0.038 0.053
2020 16 0.004 0.011 0.018 0.034
(b) 90 DTE
Year N KS Call KS Put AD Call AD Put
2005 8 0.047 0.074 0.049 0.189
2006 11 0.056 0.045 0.069 0.079
2007 13 0.048 0.047 0.075 0.08
2008 15 0.036 0.035 0.042 0.052
2009 14 0.05 0.047 0.044 0.061
2010 15 0.053 0.052 0.043 0.075
2011 16 0.029 0.039 0.046 0.075
2012 16 0.047 0.046 0.057 0.093
2013 15 0.025 0.036 0.04 0.085
2014 15 0.03 0.035 0.041 0.074
2015 15 0.021 0.017 0.029 0.045
2016 15 0.028 0.023 0.034 0.047
2017 16 0.023 0.023 0.037 0.054
2018 16 0.01 0.011 0.026 0.035
2019 15 0.015 0.015 0.029 0.038
2020 15 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.01
(c) 120 DTE
Year N KS Call KS Put AD Call AD Put
2005 3 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
2006 5 0.026 0.023 0.07 0.128
2007 8 0.035 0.036 0.057 0.055
2008 8 0.076 0.077 0.025 0.049
2009 8 0.049 0.035 0.036 0.039
2010 8 0.039 0.033 0.029 0.048
2011 15 0.024 0.029 0.036 0.058
2012 15 0.042 0.034 0.043 0.078
2013 14 0.023 0.028 0.032 0.059
2014 15 0.026 0.027 0.033 0.055
2015 16 0.016 0.015 0.02 0.036
2016 15 0.033 0.019 0.026 0.037
2017 15 0.025 0.022 0.038 0.046
2018 16 0.006 0.007 0.019 0.027
2019 14 0.008 0.008 0.02 0.026
2020 16 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.007
(d) 180 DTE
Year N KS Call KS Put AD Call AD Put
2005 2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.015
2006 4 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.015
2007 8 0.032 0.026 0.038 0.045
2008 8 0.046 0.05 0.026 0.037
2009 8 0.022 0.012 0.016 0.02
2010 8 0.025 0.027 0.023 0.039
2011 8 0.026 0.019 0.027 0.028
2012 9 0.022 0.016 0.021 0.033
2013 9 0.018 0.023 0.017 0.04
2014 10 0.014 0.021 0.022 0.039
2015 10 0.015 0.01 0.015 0.023
2016 9 0.028 0.008 0.021 0.017
2017 9 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.024
2018 10 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.015
2019 9 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.009
2020 12 0.013 0.018 0.008 0.021
Note: Summary results for each year of our sample is provided in the table above, where
N represents the number of options expiration dates in which we conduct our goodness of
fit tests on. For each option expiration date, we calculate the proportion of trading days
in which the actual and implied distributions are similar. Finally, we take an average of all
expiration dates sampled in a given year.
These results are counter-intuitive to the notion that it is harder to achieve the critical
value under the K-S statistic. Since the K-S test has less power in the tails of the distribution,
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we should see more failure to rejects under the K-S statistic; however, we see the opposite. A
possible explanation for this may lie within the differing levels of implied volatility between
put and call options. Implied volatility tends to be higher for put options than call options
given that prices fall faster than they rise. The A-D test may be more sensitive to higher
levels of volatility in the forecasted distribution than the K-S test, negatively affecting the
rejection rate. Since the K-S test focuses on differences near the center of the distribution,
much of the emphasis is placed on options closer to at-the-money. Since implied volatility
is lower towards the center of the distribution, this may result in the underestimation of
risk-adjusted probabilities. Overall, the results of Tables 3 and 4 suggest the BSM more
accurately forecasts the probability distribution for put options than it does for call options.
Differences between the two tests can also be attributed to varying increments of days to
expiration, as the range of SPY prices in the sample used to construct the empirical dis-
tribution increases for longer dated options expiration dates. The average length of strike
prices for an options chain, seen by Tables 1 and 15, are larger for maturities greater than 90
days to expiration. Hence, contracts deep out-the-money for longer dated maturities tend to
be assigned a larger risk adjusted probability weight compared to shorter dated contracts,
which feature a reduced number of strike prices.
After answering how often the BSM implied distribution equals the actual, the next
question to ask is when BSM forecasts are most accurate. Figure 4 displays a slightly more
granular view of our results for 120 DTE. Here, the x-axis is the amount of days to expiration
starting from 120 out and the y-axis is the unique options expiration dates. As opposed to
Figure 3, with Figure 4 we can see at which point in time the implied distribution from
the BSM begins to accurately predict the risk-adjusted probabilities of the underlying price
path. In addition, we can also observe the frequency of similarity between both distributions
for each specific trading day. This is especially evident when looking across all options chains
for contracts that have 60 DTE versus 180 DTE, which can be found in the Appendix. In
Figure 4, a similar pattern emerges between option types and GOF tests; the probability
distributions are most similar closer to expiration. In the early days of the option, beginning
on trading day 120, there seems to be very little similarity in the distributions of risk adjusted
probabilities. Specifically, about 5-10 trading days prior to expiration, the K-S and A-D
test show distributional similarity between the implied and actual distributions. Closer to
expiration, there is a shift in the assignment of risk adjusted probabilities away from deeper
out-the-money contracts and into strike prices closer to the true underlying price path. That
is, out the-money contracts have a significantly lower likelihood of being in-the-money within
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Figure 4: In Depth Summary Results for 120 DTE
Note: Implied BSM distribution and actual distribution tested under the K-S (top two
sub-figures) and A-D (bottom two sub-figures) test for each unique expiration date across
120 days to expiration. The blue and red colors mean the null hypothesis was rejected on
that day, meaning the two distributions do not come from the same underlying population
distribution. The green and yellow colors mean we failed to reject the null hypothesis
on a given day, meaning the two distributions are from the same underlying population
distribution.
a short time frame prior to expiration.
Different from the K-S test, much of the distributional difference in the A-D test is de-
termined in the tails. Far out from maturity, the BSM tends to overestimate the tails of
the estimated CDF of N(d2). This is indicative of the BSM, again, having relatively weak
predictive power in determining the price path of future SPY prices. Why might this be the
case? The K-S test tends to overestimate the distributional similarity of the implied and ac-
tual probabilities, and the A-D test has more power than the standard K-S test comparison.
Even so, the A-D test finds consistent results, compared to the K-S test, of distributional
similarity between our two samples close to expiration. This result is backed by the visual
representation of Figure20 4. The issue with the BSM is how probability measures are de-
20This also includes our visuals in the Appendix for Figures 8 , 9, and 10.
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termined when factoring implied volatility21. With implied volatility being relatively higher
for option contracts that are deep in- and out-of-the-money, the BSM overestimates the
likelihood of the option being exercised above a given strike price. Kownatzki and Sabouni
(2019) present the case of risk exposure to market downturns that limit the profitability
of options trading strategies, such as in strangles. This is the case, as Kownatzki (2016)
suggests, of the BSM exceedingly overestimating risk in periods of market normalcy. BSM
assigns probabilities to a variety of strike prices in an options chain, even for deep in- and
out-of-the-money contracts approaching expiration. Specifically, deep OTM contracts have
a small likelihood of ever being exercised, but have significantly smaller option premiums
compared to strike prices closer to ATM. In practice, traders may be net sellers of options
due to the uncertainty underlying options farther out from expiration. Days prior to expi-
ration, the need for OTM options to hedge large price swings is less needed. Hence, closer
to maturity the BSM tends to predict risk-adjusted probabilities of SPY more accurately.
A greater question arises about the implications of a short time horizon in the predictive
power of the BSM: are traders better off being net holders of options closer to maturity? In
days leading up to expiration, option premiums may be relatively expensive for strike prices
with a greater probability of exercise (N(d2)). Hence, profitability in such a strategy may
be undermined by the cost of undertaking the options contract. Implied volatility may also
be relatively high in shorted dated options, especially for ATM and deep ITM options illus-
trated by Figure 12. Undertaking a long position in a contract may be difficult and risky to
undertake in the short-run, even in light of distributional similarity of market expectations
implied by the BSM and underlying price.
1.5 Conclusion
The BSM framework has been a key tool in modeling derivatives, and the underlying charac-
teristics of a security. We used the BSM to model the predictability of options in determining
the price path of SPY by estimating N(d2). Our results suggest the market expectations as
backed out by the BSM falls short in forecasting the price path of SPY, which we determine
by conducting a two sample K-S and A-D GOF test. In shorter time frames particularly
prior to expiration, we begin to see a similarity in the two sample distributions. Much of
the probability density in the distribution of N(d2) seems to be overestimated by the BSM,
suggesting the distribution is fat tailed for options deep in and out the-money. This issue
21Issues such as non-stationarity in volatility may be one main issue with the BSM overestimating implied
probability distributions.
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of non-normality in financial time-series data is common and is evident in our analysis of
the BSM when assessing risk-adjusted probabilities. Nonetheless, we examine a unique phe-
nomenon of changing risk-adjusted probability measures. Through time, the shape of the
CDF of N(d2) on an options chain changes. This change can be characterized by traders
assessing less and less probability for tail events to occur the closer we get to expiration.
Hence, strike prices within a narrow band closest to the underlying spot price are much more
likely to occur closer to expiration.
The K-S and A-D tests provide a non-parametric approach to modeling the forecasted
likelihood of options expiring in the-money. We find that the resulting distributions differ
considerably, specifically in time horizons greater than 40-60 days from expiration. Much
of this is attributed to the volatility smirk on options, where deep in- and out-of-the-money
options have the highest measures of implied volatility. This difference diminishes as time
passes, where a reduction in the time value component of the option results in a more
accurate measure of option prices and risk. We find this to be the case in our analysis, where
the probability distribution from BSM reflects the underlying price path of SPY better as
an option approaches maturity.
We do not find the BSM to be a good forecasting tool for longer time horizons: when
options are far from expiration. Instead, greater research is needed on how risk-adjusted
probabilities from N(d2) are affected by factors such as implied volatility. We see from a
Monte Carlo simulation of assuming constant volatility that the probability of tail events
are overestimated from the BSM. This is because implied volatility is allowed to vary across
an options chain, assigning higher risk to certain strike prices. Longer dated options seem to
not reflect market expectations on the future underlying price path, based on the likelihood
of exercise determined by N(d2). This reflects the inability of traders to accurately predict
future price movements, and indeed overall market trends.
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2 Chapter 2: Forecast Error: A Cause of Government
Intervention or Market Conditions?
Coauthored with Hisam Sabouni
2.1 Introduction
Often, economists are tasked with creating models to forecast the state of the economy.
Forecasting in macroeconomics is inherently challenging, as often economists do not have a
clear sense of the current state of the world to make a solid judgement about the future state
of the world. For instance, most macroeconomic data series arrive at slow intervals and are
often subject to substantial revisions. There is improvement on the speed of macroeconomic
data through the advent of high frequency indicators that provide near real time insights into
the health of the economy Sabouni (2018), Cavallo and Rigobon (2016), Choi and Varian
(2009)).
The Survey of Professional Forecasters, is a quarterly survey conducted by the American
Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) from
1968:Q4 until taken over by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia in 1990:Q2 [Croushore
(1993)]. The Survey of Professional Forecasters is the oldest quarterly survey of macroeco-
nomic forecasters in the U.S. The SPF is sent to various professional economists which gains
insight on their views about the economy over the next few years, and is considered to be
one of the best aggregations of economic forecasts [Zarnowitz and Braun (1993)]. The survey
mostly asks for point forecasts, for a range of variables (such as U.S business indicators, im-
plied forecasts and macroeconomic indicators) and time horizons, but also requests a density
forecasts 21. Diebold et al. (1997) assessed the adequacy of SPF forecasts, specifically the
density forecasts for output and inflation, and found SPF forecasts suffered from overesti-
mation22 as well as serial correlation23. In contrast to Diebold et al. (1997), we are aware
that the SPF forecasts are somewhat inaccurate and analyze which type of inputs are largely
responsible for increases in SPF forecast error.
The purpose of our paper is to study the characteristics of error in economic forecasts
over time and analyze whether the forecast error from SPF is mainly driven by two factors:
21Density forecasts are requested for output and inflation. Forecasts were requested for nominal inflation,
until they switched to asking survey respondents to provide forecasts for real output in the early 1980s.
22For the probability of large negative inflation shocks.
23Present in inflation surprises.
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macroeconomic conditions or government intervention via monetary and fiscal policy. We
focus on explaining the variation in errors of SPF forecasts across three financial securities
by isolating the effects of changes in fiscal and monetary policy as well as changes in various
macroeconomic indicators. While very little is known about the construction of the point
estimates and density forecasts reported by survey participants Diebold et al. (1997), we
can analyze whether the driving force of SPF forecast error for various securities stems from
changes in government policy or changes in macroeconomic indicators (or macroeconomic
conditions such as changes in). Each survey participant may use a different forecasting
model, but our analysis will still shed light on which group of variables is most likely throwing
off their estimates. We analyze the average output of survey participants and concentrate
on groups of inputs. Using principal component analysis, we reduce the dimensions of
these macroeconomic variables and interpret the first two principal components of the macro
PCA as the overall effect macroeconomic conditions has on forecast error. Using a linear
regression, we test whether monetary policy, fiscal policy, or the combination of the two, are
responsible for increases in the SPF’s forecast error of each security. Our goal is to isolate
the effects on SPF forecasts of changes in fiscal and monetary policy, as well as changes in
other macroeconomic indicators. We hypothesize government intervention greatly impacts
the expectations of professional forecasters.
We find that increases in monetary policy largely affects the short-term security used in
our analysis, with limited economic impact to the forecast error of the two longer-dated secu-
rities. Fiscal policy has a statistically significant effect, but relatively insignificant economic
effect, on the forecast error of the included longer-dated securities. Increases in macroeco-
nomic conditions consistently has a statistically significant, and rather significant economic
effect, on the forecast error of all three securities in our analysis. While many papers focus
on the ex-post evaluation of ex-ante forecasts, we contribute to existing literature by exam-
ining which groups of inputs may largely be contributing to SPF forecast error. Forecasters
may be able to use this information to adjust their expectations surrounding future changes
in government policy or macroeconomic conditions. We also pull from existing machine
learning literature in utilizing sub-models to explain baseline model errors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature
review regarding the effect of government policy within the U.S. financial market. Section 3
summarizes the data. In Section 4, we describe the methods used to reduce the dimension-
ality of our macroeconomic data as well as introduce our formal statistical model. Section 5
presents and discusses our results. The last section concludes.
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2.2 Government Policy’s Impact in Financial Markets
When investors are uncertain about the future, they will generally feel less safe tying up
their capital in longer term securities such as 10-year Treasury bonds. Analyzing a bond’s
yield across various maturities to form what is known as a bond’s yield curve provides a good
measure of future economic growth expectations. The relationship between long and short-
term yields (ex. 10-year and 3-month) helps measure overall market uncertainty Tsatsaronis
and Smets (1997). As a result, many investors analyze the steepness of the yield curve
as a proxy for other investor preferences. In fact, by imposing no-arbitrage conditions, an
individual can use yield curve data to back out what market expectations are on future
interest rates. Therefore, accurate forecasting of the implied yield is crucially important to
generate precise market predictions. However, through no-arbitrage restrictions, government
intervention, such as monetary policy, has the ability to affect the entire term structure of
interest rates since the actions of the Federal Reserve at the short end of the yield curve
influence the dynamics of the long end of the yield curve Ang et al. (2011).
While the yield curve is directly tied to the actions of the federal governments actions
(fiscal policy), it is monetary policy that influences the slope of the yield curve (see Bomfim
(2003), Mumtaz and Surico (2008), Brand et al. (2006)). When there is an increase in mon-
etary policy via instruments such as the effective federal funds rate (EFFR) by the Federal
Reserve, this leads to a rise in short-term interest rates to reduce inflationary pressures.
The economy will experience a slowdown (rGDP decreases) and the yield curve will flatten.
The actions of the Federal Reserve affect short-term interest rates differently compared to
long-term interest rates (see Wood (1964) Haldane and Read (2000), Kuttner (2000)). The
effect of monetary tightening as previously described is the effect on short-term interest
rates. For long-term interest rates, the tightening effects the market’s future expectations
about inflation which affects the rate investors are willing to accept on longer term debts.
In contrast, an increase in fiscal policy would increase expectations of inflation in the long-
term. Investors will demand greater yield at the long end of the curve to compensate for the
diminishing value of money. When analyzing the effect of both monetary and fiscal policy
on the nominal Treasury yield curve, Evans and Marshall (2007) found monetary policy was
an important transmission pathway for both technology shocks and shocks to preferences
for current consumption on interest rate variability, while limited evidence supported the
importance of fiscal policy.
In addition to monetary and fiscal policy, macroeconomic indicators also can have a large
impact on forecasting the implied yield as the dynamics of yields are tied to the dynamics
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of macroeconomic variables. Macroeconomic variables and yields are both characterized by
a high degree of co-movement since a large part of their dynamics are driven by common
forces?. Yields that have a maturity of less than one year move closely with the policy
instrument used by central banks; which responds to changes in inflation, economic activity,
or other economic conditions Taylor (993a). The average level of the yield curve is correlated
with the inflation rate and the spread between long and short rates with temporary business
cycles conditions Diebold et al. (2004). The short-term interest rate is set by the central bank
according to its macroeconomic stabilization goals. Long-term yields are largely determined
by expectations of future short-term interest rates, which in turn depend on expectations of
the macroeconomic variables Diebold and Rudebusch (2013). Additionally, macroeconomic
variables have a strong effect on future movements of the yield curve Diebold et al. (2004).
Given this relationship, the inclusion of macroeconomic variables has improved the accuracy
of forecasting future interest rates Ang and Piazzesi (2003). Duffee (2013) shows macro-
finance models can be used to improve forecasting security yields that are out-of-sample by
reducing the problem of over-fitting. In this paper, we analyze for various securities whether
it is monetary policy, fiscal policy and/or macroeconomic indicators that largely effects SPF
forecast error.
2.3 Data
This study focuses on three main securities; the three-month Treasury bill, the ten-year
Treasury note and Moody’s AAA corporate bond. We obtain quarterly yields for each
security from Bloomberg. The sample period is from 1980 to 2018, except for Moody’s
AAA corporate bond, an index of AAA rated corporate bonds24, which had data available
from 1983 to 2018. Quarterly forecast data for these three securities was obtained from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Forecasters provided quarterly average projections for one to six quarters ahead25. For each
security, we construct the average forecast at each quarterly projection as the simple average
of forecasters. Using a time trend variable, we are then able to stack each of our six models on
top of each other for our analysis; essentially averaging across six epsilons26. By doing so, we
increase the total amount of forecast data available, which is needed at this data frequency.
24This index tracks the average yield for companies with AAA ratings by Moody
25Except for Moody’s AAA corporate bond, which SPF did not have yield projections for one quarter
ahead.
26Except for Moody’s AAA corporate bond, which will be averaging across five errors, or epsilons, in our
analysis.
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Forecast Error
Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
3-Month T-Bill FE -0.359 1.348 -0.922 0.430
Moody’s AAA C-Bond FE -0.436 0.852 -0.855 0.011
10-Year T-Bond FE -0.380 0.771 -0.904 0.139
Panel B: Variables that Largely Affect Forecast Error
Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
Effective Federal Funds Rate 4.587 3.944 1.038 6.618
US Govt Receipts 12.736 3.725 9.597 15.667
US Govt Outlays 13.474 3.672 11.026 15.075
Real Gross Domestic Product 2.786 2.724 1.500 4.125
Personal Consumption Expenditures 2.701 1.697 1.675 3.450
Federal Debt 65.429 21.192 52.553 78.085
Unemployment Rate 6.257 1.669 5.000 7.300
Note: Panel A displays summary statistics on the SPF forecast error from 1980 Q4 to 2018 Q3 for
three-month Treasury bill and ten-year Treasury note and from 1983 Q1 to 2018 Q3 for Moody’s AAA
corporate bond. Forecasts are the average of all unique forecasts for a given quarter. Forecast error
is actual yield minus the average forecasted yield across all 6 projections for a given quarter. Panel
B displays summary statistics on the variables that largely affect forecast error from 1980-2018. Each
variable listed in Panel A and Panel B of 7 is expressed as a rate.
For a timeline and more detailed explanation of forecast projections, see the Appendix. To
ensure data quality, we require there to be a minimum of 2 unique forecasters to average
across for a given quarter, counted by unique analyst using SPF (Id). After analyzing the
data, we found there is at least 9 or more unique forecasts made each quarter between 1980
Q1 to 2018 Q3. This adds consistency to our average quarterly forecasts.
We use the effective federal funds rate as measure for monetary policy from the Federal
Reserve of Economic Data (FRED). As a measure for fiscal policy, we use receipts and out-
lays. Monthly receipt and outlay data were collected from the Monthly Treasury Statement
provided by the Fiscal Data.Treasury.gov. As a measure of macroeconomic conditions, we
utilize several macroeconomic variables. Quarterly real gross domestic product (rGDP), per-
sonal consumption expenditures (PCE), total federal debt and the unemployment rate for
the U.S was collected from FRED. We convert receipts, outlays and total federal debt as a
percentage of real GDP.
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics of our dependent variable, forecast error, for each
of the three securities. We define forecast error in this paper as the actual yield minus the
average SPF forecasted yield across all 6 projections for a given quarter. Forecast error
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statistics for each projection separately can be found in the Appendix. We additionally
show in Table 7 descriptive statistics on variables that largely affect forecast error of the yield
curve: government policy instruments and macroeconomic indicators. Panel A reveals SPF
forecast error for all three securities is negative, meaning on average, forecasts are overesti-
mated. Average forecast error is largest for Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond, while the two
treasury securities, the three-month treasury bill and ten-year treasury note, have relatively
equal levels. However, between all three securities, forecast error was spread out over the
largest range of values for the three-month treasury bill with a standard deviation of 1.348
percentage points. This could be a result of yields varying so much in the short-run in com-
parison to the long-run. Panel B summarizes key variables that are responsible for changes
in the forecast error of a securities’ yield or yield curve. The first three variables under
Panel B are government policy instruments and the remaining variables are macroeconomic
indicator variables. Each of these variables is expressed as a rate or has been converted into
a rate (as a percentage of GDP).
Figure 5 displays average SPF forecast error across time for each of the three securities.
The black line represents the average error for forecasts made 1 quarter into the future to 6
quarters into the future. The red dotted lines represent the 1st and 3rd quartiles; meaning,
50% of the SPF forecasts are within these two red dotted lines. From Figure 5 we can
see the black line for each of the three securities increases as we forecast further into the
future. This makes sense because there is more uncertainty the further we go out in time.
Average SPF forecast error increases the sharpest across the 6 forecast horizons for the three
month Treasury bill. We can also notice in the left graph for the three month Treasury bill
as forecasts are made further into the future, the red dotted lines separating further from
black line. This means the breadth of the forecast error distribution is wider (forecasts are
more spread out, not close around the mean) for SPF forecasts made 4-6 qtrs. into future
compared to the other two securities.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Dimension Reduction with PCA
Since we are using quarterly data, we have a limit on degrees of freedom. To address this is-
sue, we apply an orthogonal dimension reduction on the four macroeconomic variables which
we do not need independent effects for. By doing so, we will effectively reduce dimensional-
ity or complexity of our models while sacrificing only a small portion of the total variation
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Figure 5: Average SPF Forecast Error Across Each Quarterly Projection Horizon
Note:: The left figure displays SPF forecast error across quarterly projections for the three-
month Treasury bill. The middle figure displays SPF forecast error across quarterly projec-
tions for Moody’s AAA corporate bond. Lastly, the figure on the right displays SPF forecast
error across quarterly projections for ten-year Treasury note. The solid black line represents
the average SPF forecast error across quarter projections. The two outer red dotted lines
represent the 1st and 3rd quantiles of the average forecast error made at each quarterly
projection.
from all four macroeconomic variables. In addition to solving the issue of limited degrees
of freedom, PCA is also a technique for analyzing multiple regression data that suffer from
multicollinearity, which macroeconomic data generally does, since each principal component
(PC) vector is a linear combination of all the variables and are orthogonal to one another ?.
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After determining the appropriate amount of PCs to include, a trade off between explained
variation and dimension reduction, we then run a principal components regression (PCR).
Using a PCR, we analyze the effect of the EFFR, receipts and outlays (our measures of
government policy) jointly with the collapsed vector of macroeconomic variables on SPF
forecast error by means of a multivariate unobserved components time series model that is
represented as a linear Gaussian state space framework.
To determine the appropriate amount of PCs to include in our PCRs, we utilize a scree
plot which plots the eigenvalues of factors or PCs in our analysis. The red horizontal dotted
line in the left plot of Figure 2 represents an eigenvalue equal to 1. An eigenvalue < 1 would
mean that the component actually explains less than controlling for a single explanatory
variable; therefore, we would like to discard those. Since only the first two PCs have an
eigenvalue equal to or greater than one, we will discard the third and fourth components.
The trade off to reducing dimension as previously mentioned is a “loss” in the total variance
from using all four components or all four explanatory variables. The plot on the right in
Figure 2 shows the cumulative amount of variation explained from including an additional
PC. The vertical blue dashed line represents at which PC is our cutoff and the horizontal
line represents the corresponding cumulative amount of explained variance for that number
of PCs. When we discard two components, we retain around 73% of the variance. Using two
PCs, we can effectively reduce dimensionality from four to two while only “loosing” about
17% of variance.
2.4.2 Formal Testing
We utilize three PCRs to analyze the effect macroeconomic conditions and government policy
have on SPF forecast error, one for each security. We do not include all three securities into
a panel regression to get the average effect across all three securities for a couple reasons,
such as differences in maturity lengths and liquidity levels. For those reasons, the following
PCR specification is applied to the each of the three securities:
ForecastErrort = β0 + β1EFFRt + β2Receiptt + β3Outlayt + β4PC1t
+ β5PC2t + β6Timet + β7Actualt−1 + εt
(10)
In equation (1), ForecastErrort is the actual yield minus the SPF forecasted yield for
the given security; where the forecasted yield for a given year/qtr. is the average of all unique
forecasts for that year/qtr. PC1t and PC2t are the first two PCs from the macroeconomic
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Figure 6: Scree and Cumulative Variation Plot of Macroeconomic Variables
Note: The top figure shows a scree plot used to determine the number of factors to retain
in our PCR. The x-axis represents each PC. The y-axis is the variance. The red dotted line
indicates an eigenvalue equal to one. We discard components whose eigenvalue is equal to
less than one. The bottom figure shows the cumulative variance as we include an additional
component. The x-axis represents each PC. The y-axis is the amount of variance the principal
component vector accounts for. The blue-dotted line is the cut-off of PCs we include in our
analysis. Using only two PCs, we can explain roughly 73% of the total variance while
reducing dimensionality.
PCA we described in Section 3.1. Timet is a discrete variable from 1 to 6, controlling for
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length of the forecast projection. By just putting time in the regression, we are controlling
for the linear relationship between forecast time and forecast error. Actualt−1 is previous
quarters actual yield for the given security.
2.5 Results
Table 6 displays the results for the average effect that government monetary and fiscal
policy (via EFFR, receipts and outlays) and macroeconomic conditions (via macroeconomic
indicators) have on SPF forecast error for our three main securities. Using the specification
outlined in equation 10, we are able to see the 1:1 change, (immediate effect) a change in
monetary policy, fiscal policy or macroeconomic conditions has on SPF forecast error for each
of the three securities. That is, the change in government policy or macroeconomic indicators
would be what is missing in the forecasts and hence driving the increase in forecast error.
Since forecasts are made 1-6 quarters ahead of the realized yields, the forecasts may not be
wrong. Instead, the error may be coming from policy changes made during these 1-6 quarters
after the forecast was made. From table 6 we can see a 1% increase in the EFFR (monetary
policy) leads to on average, a 1.028 percentage point increase in SPF forecast error for the
three-month treasury bill. In contrast to this short-term security, a 1% increase in the EFFR
leads to on average a 0.13 percentage point decrease in SPF forecast error for Moody’s AAA
bond and a 0.094 percentage point decrease for the ten-year treasury note. Interestingly,
increases in monetary policy had statistically significant effects to SPF forecast error of
Treasury type securities, while SPF forecast error of corporate bonds suffered minimally.
Turning to the effect of fiscal policy, we can examine two average effects: what happens to
SPF forecast error with increases in government spending and what happens to SPF forecast
error with increases in government collections (i.e. taxes). A 1% increase in receipts (gov-
ernment collections) leads to on average, a 0.003 percentage point increase in SPF forecast
of the three-month Treasury bill, a 0.058 percentage point increase for Moody’s AAA bond
and a 0.021 percentage point increase for the ten-year Treasury note, respectively. The esti-
mated coefficient for the three-month Treasury bill is small and statistically insignificant. In
contrast to collections, a 1% increase in outlays (government spending) leads to on average,
a 0.054 percentage point increase in SPF forecast error of the three-month Treasury bill,
a 0.029 percentage point increase for Moody’s AAA bond and a 0.019 percentage point in-
crease for the ten-year Treasury note, respectively. The estimated coefficient for the ten-year
Treasury note is small and statistically insignificant. These results suggest changes in govern-
ment collections largely effect the forecast error of longer term securities while government
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Table 6: Regression Output
Dependent variable: Forecast Error
Three Month Treasury Bill Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond Ten Year Treasury Bond
EFFR 1.028∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.094∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.028) (0.030)
Receipt 0.003 0.058∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Outlay 0.054∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.019
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012)
Time −0.142∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016)
PC1 0.684∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.060) (0.075)
PC2 −0.195∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.037)
Actualt−1 −0.812∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.046) (0.049)
Constant −1.794∗∗∗ −2.983∗∗∗ −1.873∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.466) (0.361)
Observations 873 695 621
R2 0.474 0.151 0.214
Adjusted R2 0.470 0.143 0.205
Residual Std. Error 0.981 (df = 865) 0.789 (df = 687) 0.688 (df = 613)
F Statistic 111.386∗∗∗ (df = 7; 865) 17.486∗∗∗ (df = 7; 687) 23.824∗∗∗ (df = 7; 613)
Note: This table summarizes the average effects of U.S. monetary policy via EFFR, U.S. fiscal policy via government receipts
and outlays and overall market conditions via the 1st and 2nd PCs of the PCA. These results are presented for the three-month
Treasury bill, Moody’s AAA corporate bond and the ten-year Treasury bond.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
spending largely impacts the forecast error of short-term securities in our analysis.
Increases in overall macroeconomic conditions also negatively impacts SPF forecast er-
ror. PC1 is the 1st principal component we included in our PCR, which is comprised of a
linear combination of 4 macroeconomic variables and accounts for most of the total variation
between these variables (as descried in Section 4.1). A 1% increase in overall macroeconomic
conditions (PC1) leads to on average, a 0.684 percentage point increase in SPF forecast of
the three-month Treasury bill, a 0.340 percentage point increase for Moody’s AAA bond
and a 0.439 percentage point increase for the ten-year Treasury note, respectively. These
results suggest shocks to macroeconomic indicators are hard to forecast; these changes may
be more unexpected and thus difficult to form accurate expectations. While the average
effect of monetary policy via EFFR on the three-month Treasury bill is largest across all
securities and between all variable types, increases in macroeconomic conditions affect all
security types to a relatively high degree. The second PC, which captures the second largest
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unique27 variance, on average decreases SPF forecast error for the two Treasury securities.
The models for each of the three securities, especially for the three-month Treasury bill, have
relatively high R2, which supports the notion that future changes to government policy and
macroeconomic indicators largely can explain the variation in SPF forecast error.
2.6 Conclusion
The SPF is comprised of an expert panel of forecasters and has been around for several
years providing highly valued forecasts. We directly test the variation in errors of SPF
forecasts for three main securities and estimate whether future changes in government policy
or macroeconomic conditions is the driving force of these errors by impacting the expectations
of professional forecasters. Distinguishing the role government policy plays in SPF forecast
error provides insight into how powerful a shock to monetary or fiscal policy can be within
the US financial market as well as for macroeconomic shocks.
Since we have quarterly data, we utilize machine learning dimension reduction techniques
in order to preserve degrees of freedom and enhance the consistency of our estimates. We
reduce dimensionality by discarding two PCs while still retaining 73% of our macroeconomic
explanatory variables. The remaining two PCs are a linear combination of all four macroe-
conomic variables, which can be interpreted as a vector of overall macroeconomic conditions.
We increase the number of forecast observations in our study by essentially stacking six mod-
els on top of one another. In other words, we effectively have six ε’s; one for each forecast
horizon. Average SPF forecast error increases the further the forecasts extend, consistent
with the notion there is more uncertainty as we go further into the future. Average SPF
forecasts tend to be overestimated for each of the securities.
We find SPF forecasts are highly sensitive to changes to both input groups that we include
in our study, but forecasts were more consistently sensitive across security types to changes
in macroeconomic conditions. In regard to government policy, increases in monetary policy
via the EFFR have especially large impacts on SPF forecast error. Investors may perceive
forecasts for short-term securities as less accurate when the expectations for future changes
in monetary policy are high. Overall, our results suggest changes in government policy
affect the short-term security in our analysis to a large magnitude, but SPF forecasts are
largely sensitive more consistently to changes in macroeconomic conditions across the three
securities.
27The first eigenvector is orthogonal to the second eigenvector as to maximize the variance accounted for.
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3 Chapter 3: Seasonal Decomposition of Abnormal
Market Returns
3.1 Introduction
The role of capital markets is to signal information about the relative value of goods and
services. For example, a firm announces their end-of-quarter earnings and investors buy, sell,
or do nothing based on that information. If there is novel favorable information within the
announcement, investors may start buying this firm’s stock and if there is novel unfavorable
information, investors may instead sell. When investors react irrationally to this information,
the signal from capital markets becomes distorted. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
proposes prices fully reflect all available information and that new information is primarily
responsible for stock price movements Fama (1969); however, research in the 1980’s, which
has come to form what is now known as behavioral finance, found several financial market
anomalies that violate the EMH. Some popular examples of these financial market anoma-
lies are the January Effect, which is a pattern that shows higher returns tend to be earned
in the first month of the year that remains unexplained after controlling for tax induced
transactions. Or the Weekend Effect, which identified stock returns on Mondays are often
significantly lower than those of the immediately preceding Friday, possibly due to the ten-
dency of firms releasing bad news on a Friday after the markets close, which then depresses
stock prices on Monday Thaler (1987). From these examples it becomes quite clear that
Fama (1969) was correct, ”Like any other extreme null hypothesis, I do not expect it [the
EMH] to be literally true”. Markets are neither fully efficient nor fully inefficient at pricing
information, which can lead to investment opportunities for investors.
The question then becomes, when do markets price information correctly and when do
they not? Is it the type of information that matters, or the timing of when that infor-
mation is released that causes market inefficiency? Generally, information that is readily
available and easy to interpret is more likely to be incorporated into the market efficiently
by investors. Since markets are neither fully efficient nor fully inefficient, we can expect
individual securities to have a mixture of correctly and incorrectly priced information. For
example, Roll (1984) analyzed price fluctuations in the market for orange juice and found
news about weather conditions, a large determinant of the supply of oranges, can explain
only a small fraction of the variation in returns. weather related to orange juice production is
easy to measure, reported accurately and consistently by the National weather Service of the
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Department of Commerce. So, while weather-related news may be incorporated efficiently,
other types of information are not.
Challenging the view that price movements are wholly attributable to the arrival of new
information, this paper analyzes anomalies within the US financial market in the context of
earnings announcements. Frazzini (2007) found stock prices rise around earnings announce-
ment dates and that said price increase is strongly related to the fact that volume surges
around the announcement date. Stocks with high volume around earnings announcements
had both high premiums and a spike in buying by individual investors, suggesting prices
rise around announcement dates due to buying pressure from investors. Savor et al. (2016)
offers a risk-based explanation for the earnings announcement premium. Savor et al. (2016)
shows investors use earnings announcements to adjust their performance expectations of
non-announcing firms. In result of this, the co-variance between firm-specific and market
cash-flow news spikes around announcements. This means although a firm’s market beta
(risk) may increase on the earnings announcement date, the increase in its expected return
will be larger than can be explained by its risk alone. Savor et al. (2016) expects a positive
announcement return even if the difference between news and expectations of earnings by
investors is zero.
These high premiums and spikes in investor trading behavior following an earnings an-
nouncement leads to abnormal returns. Earnings announcements fit the criteria of being
readily available and contain easy to interpret information, meaning they should be more
likely to be efficiently be incorporated into the market. However, with earnings announce-
ments, the difference between the realization of the announcement and investor’s expecta-
tions comes as an unexpected shock resulting in the immediate buying/selling of securities
and results in abnormal returns (see Ball and Brown (2014), Chambers and Penman (1984)).
Engelberg et al. (2018) found abnormal returns are six times higher on earnings announce-
ment days which can be associated with investor’s biased expectations. Linnainmaa and
Zhang (2019) documents abnormal returns are accumulated at different rates throughout
the announcement period. Stocks earn significantly negative abnormal returns before earn-
ings announcements and positive abnormal returns after the announcement. Interestingly,
Linnainmaa and Zhang (2019) found these abnormal return patterns are unrelated to the
earnings announcement premium.
Studies surrounding the effect of earnings announcements on stock returns are even
greater importance as the information content within earnings announcements has been
increasing for quite some time. Landsman and Maydew (2002) et al. found an increase
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in the informativeness of quarterly earnings announcements from 1969-1999. Francis et al.
(2002) et al. believes this increase is due to expanded concurrent disclosures in firms’ earn-
ings announcements, specifically, the inclusion of detailed income statements. More recently,
Beaver et al. (2017) et al. found there is a rising increase in information content of quarterly
earnings announcements. They found one-day announcement windows exhibited roughly
twice the price response observed for three-day windows; measured as the absolute magni-
tude of stock price revision at earnings announcements relative to price revision at other
times from 1999 to 2012. While earnings announcements are not responsible for the day-to-
day fluctuations in returns, they do play a large role when a firm experiences an extremely
large stock price movement. I hypothesize it is not random occurrence firms experience this
extreme variation, rather it is largely driven by investor’s behavior to earnings surprises and
that behavior is asymmetrically and seasonally dependent. In order to demonstrate this, I
analyze the role earnings surprises have on abnormal returns.
Abnormal returns are defined in this paper as the actual return minus the expected
return. In traditional event studies, expected returns are generally calculated by a mar-
ket model, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the Fama French three factor model
or any of the Fama French model extensions. These traditional event study models as-
sume volatility or systematic risk of a security, compared to the market, is homoskedastic
throughout the announcement period; however, the price reaction that occurs following an
earnings surprise results in an increase to the variability and co-variability of securities re-
turns Ball and Kothari (1991). Not allowing risk to vary decreases the ability to distinguish
between increased expected returns and actual abnormal returns Ball and Kothari (1991).
Given that stock returns generally exhibit time-varying volatility, a model which adjusts for
risk may provide more efficient estimates in the calculation of abnormal returns. Ball and
Kothari (1991) found when adjusting for risk increases at earnings announcements, firm’s
still accumulated abnormal returns. Using a conditional heteroskedastic model, such as a
general auto-regressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) model, relaxes the restriction
that systematic risk of returns is constant during the announcement period. More specifi-
cally, a GARCH-in-mean (GARCH-M) model adds a heteroskedasticity term into the mean
equation, which allows risk to vary across time. I use a CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M model
which I believe can more accurately distinguish between an increase in expected returns and
true abnormal returns given that a GARCH model has the ability to capture the volatility
clustering that prices exhibit Bollerslev et al. (1986) Engle (1982) Ball and Kothari (1991).
Using a fixed effects linear regression, I test the role earnings surprises play in gener-
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ating abnormal returns by estimating whether investors’ reactions to earnings surprises are
asymmetric and/or seasonal. While we expect investors to react to announcements, we do
not expect their reaction to be dependent on the month of the announcement. In fact,
any seasonal patterns that persistently exist in financial markets should be arbitraged away
by financial incentives of market participants. Although limits to arbitrage could result in
changes to returns, it is not responsible for the behavior of investors to these announcements.
If limits to arbitrage was responsible for these changes, investors would simply exploit this
seasonality. I document that there does exist heterogeneous reactions from investors depen-
dent on the earnings announcement sign and month. An earnings beat on average causes a
0.0017 percentage point (340% 28) increase in daily abnormal returns. In contrast, an earn-
ings miss on average causes a 0.0006 percentage point (120% 29) decrease in daily abnormal
returns. These results suggest negative earnings surprises on average have a limited impact
on returns. By seasonally decomposing abnormal returns, I found stock prices experience
much larger variation in some months than others for both an earnings beat and earnings
miss. Stock prices experience the largest volatility from an earnings beat announced in June,
resulting in an average 0.0035 percentage point (700% 30) increase in daily abnormal returns.
Stock prices experience the largest volatility from an earnings miss announced in December,
with an on average 0.0022 percentage point (440% 31) decrease in daily abnormal returns.
Previous literature surrounding market efficiency has thoroughly examined the role of
earnings surprises on abnormal returns; however, I make contributions to this area of research
in two ways. Since stock returns series generally exhibit time-varying volatility, a GARCH
model can more efficiently estimate the variation in returns and thus abnormal returns by
isolating the price movements that occur at the tail end of the distribution. There are very
few papers which calculate abnormal returns in this manner. I contribute to these papers
which provide evidence that a GARCH model can more precisely identify whether a firm
is experiencing an abnormal return versus an increase in expected returns. I also add to
existing papers by providing evidence investor’s reactions to earnings surprises are not only
asymmetric but seasonal, leading to firm’s accumulation of seasonal abnormal returns. By
identifying which months experience large variation in stock prices due to announcements,
investors can incorporate this seasonality into their investment strategy. Financial derivatives
such as options provide a source of insurance during months that suffer large variation in
28This is equivalent to a 340% increase in abnormal returns at the mean.
29This is equivalent to a 120% decrease in abnormal returns at the mean.
30This is equivalent to a 700% increase in abnormal returns at the mean.
31This is equivalent to a 440% increase in abnormal returns at the mean.
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prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the data.
Section 3 describes calculating abnormal returns and presents the methods and results for
analyzing the effect earnings surprises have on abnormal returns. The last section concludes.
3.2 Data
This study uses daily stock data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)32
and quarterly earnings announcement data from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(I/B/E/S). The sample period is from January 1990 to December 2019. Using daily data over
the course of 29 years, I have an extremely large sample size of over 8 million observations.
Since we are analyzing such rare events, it is important to have a very large data set in order
to detect an effect. I drop all firms who do not have regularly scheduled quarterly earnings
announcements by removing firms whose average distance between earnings announcement
dates (anndats act) is greater than 150 days. I chose 150 days to include late announcing
firms but exclude firms that announce semi-annually in the analysis. I limit the sample
of firms to U.S. publicly traded firms that were listed on the S&P 500 anytime between
1990 and 2019 to represent the entire financial market. Daily Fama-French factor data,
specifically market risk premium, was collected from the Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS) website from 1990-2019 to control for daily market changes.
Average forecast is calculated for each unique earnings announcement date as the simple
average of all analyst’s forecasts as a proxy for investor’s expectations of firm’s end-of-quarter
earnings. To ensure data quality, I require there to be at least 2 unique forecasts for each
announcement, counted by unique analyst using I/B/E/S detail file (analys). After investi-
gating earnings forecasts for a sample of 100 companies, I/B/E/S documents in it’s Research
Bibliography Sixth Edition that there exists a bias towards overestimation of actual earnings
performance; which was determined to be result of both exogenous and endogenous factors.
Earnings announcements are generally consistent in nature and the notion of overestimating
earnings forecasts is also a generally consistent trend. Therefore, while it may be likely that
market participants are also aware of this overestimation bias in forecasts for end-of-quarter
earnings, I do not adjust forecasts for this bias since this bias comes directly from the firms.
It has been shown that median earnings surprise has overtime shifted from small negative
(miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small
positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) Brown (2001). More recently, it has
32For simplicity reasons, all firms with a price below one dollar were removed.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Fundamental Variables
Number of Days Without Number of Days With
Earnings Announcement 2,059,883 27,266
Earnings Announcement w/ 3 day window 1,919,502 167,647
Earnings Beat 2,077,485 9,664
Earnings Beat w/ 3 day window 2,023,186 63,963
Earnings Miss 2,079,986 7,163
Earnings Miss w/ 3 day window 2,039,047 48,102
Panel B: Analyst Related Variables
Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
Number of Analysts 2.00 6.55 3.00 11.00
Forecasted Earnings 26,098 3,503,808.00 0.00 0.00
Forecast Error -30,552 4,607,071 0.00 0.00
Note: Panel A: Count of daily end of quarter earnings announcements, count of announcements which had an earnings beat and count
of announcements which had an earnings miss within the 1990-2018 sample. Additionally, included are the counts using a three-day
announcement window around earnings announcement, earnings beat and earnings miss dates. Panel B: Summary statistics on the
number of analysts, forecast, and forecast error for earnings announcements held within 1990-2018 for firms on the S&P 500 index.
Forecast is the average of all unique forecasts for a given earnings announcement. Forecast error is actual earnings minus average
forecasted earnings for a given earnings announcement.
been shown there is a positive relation between analyst coverage and whether a firm meets
or beats analyst forecasts, greater analyst coverage raises the pressure on managers to meet
analyst earnings forecasts. Firms will manage their earnings up a cent or two above the
analysts forecasts in order to achieve a beat Huang et al. (2017), Mindak et al. (2016).
I construct two dummy variables which represent an earnings beat and an earnings miss.
I define an earnings beat/miss as a 1 when the average forecasted earnings are at least one
standard deviation above/below a firm’s actual earnings. Additionally, although earnings
announcements are consistent in nature and generally known in advance by market par-
ticipants, it is possible for announcements to be late, early, or cancelled therefore, “one
cannot use actual announcement dates, but rather must construct a proxy for expected
announcements dates” Frazzini (2007), Cohen et al. (2007). Several prior studies regard-
ing forecasting earnings announcement dates focus mainly on a three-day window around
the announcement; see Frazzini (2007), Givoly and Palmon (1982), Chambers and Penman
(1984), Begley and Fischer (1998), and Cohen et al. (2007). I address the last issue by using
a 3-day announcement window around an earnings beat/miss.
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of my main sample as well as the earnings analysts
data from I/B/E/S. Panel A describes the number of days in my sample firms had an earnings
announcement in addition to how many of those days are earnings beats and earnings misses.
Panel B provides some descriptive statistics of the earnings data from I/B/E/S. The unit
of observation is firm-earnings-announcement. “Number of analyst” is the count of unique
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analysts. On average, there are two analysts that make forecasts for an individual company’s
earnings. The mean average forecast made for firm’s end-of-quarter earnings per share was
26,098. The mean average forecast error for earnings per share was -30,552. These results
show there are large negative forecast error outliers. Meaning, there were a few cases where
analysts forecasts were extremely optimistic in comparison to the reality of firms’ earnings.
This could be the case during uncertain economic times such as a recession or financial crisis.
3.3 Calculating Abnormal Returns
Abnormal returns are calculated as the actual return minus the expected return conditional
on the information set, Xi:
ARi,t = Ri,t − E[Ri,t|Xi] (11)
Abnormal returns are essential in determining a security’s risk-adjusted performance
when compared to the overall market; however, the calculation of abnormal returns in tra-
ditional event studies assumes the volatility or systematic risk of a security compared to the
market is homoskedastic throughout the announcement period. Since the price reaction that
occurs following an earnings surprise results in an increase to the variability of returns, I uti-
lize a CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M model which allows for risk to vary during the announcement
period. I calculate risk-adjusted expected returns using a GARCH process of the following
form:
Ri,t = φ0 + β1Rm,t + λσt + at (12)






• φ0 is a constant
• β1 is a measure of the sensitivity of Ri,t on the reference market
• Rm,t is the market return on day day t
• λ is the volatility coefficient for the mean
• σt is the conditional standard deviation (i.e. volatility) at time t
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• at is the model’s residual at time t
• α0, α1 are the parameters of the ARCH component model
• β1 is the parameter of the GARCH component model
Many studies that analyze volatility dynamics found a simple GARCH(1,1) model pro-
vides a good first approximation to the observed temporal dependencies in daily data An-
derson and Bollerslev (1998). Additional early evidence of this can be seen in Baillie and
Bollerslev (1989), Bollerslev (1987), Bollerslev et al. (1986), and Hsieh (1989). For more
recent evidence see: Miah (2016) and Lunde and Hansen (2005). The unconditional distri-
bution of a GARCH process is symmetric and leptokurtic, a similar characteristic to financial
market data. Several studies show returns are not normal but leptokurtic and “fat tailed”
relative to a normal distribution Officer (1972); Feng and Shi (2017), Mandelbrot (1963),
Fama (1965). While the GARCH model can accommodate for excess kurtosis as a result
of the propagation of shocks through time (Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)), there still
exists in most cases excess kurtosis in the standardized residuals (Calzolari et al. (2014)).
A common solution for this is to assume a fatter-tailed distribution for the error term such
as a student-t distribution, since a GARCH model with the true distribution can lead to
more efficient results (Bollerslev (1987)). Therefore, I use a CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M with
student-t distributed errors to calculate expected returns.
The leptokurtic nature of GARCH processes follows from the persistence in conditional
variance, which produces the clusters of “low volatility” and “high volatility” episodes. Ac-
cording to Diebold and Lopez (1995), any of the myriad economic forces, such as seasonality,
that produce persistence in economic dynamics may be responsible for GARCH effects. This
persistence is in the conditional second moment, therefore it is appropriate to use a GARCH
model to estimate the variance of financial market returns as the GARCH model can cap-
ture this persistence. Since the volatility builds up as the announcement date approaches
and then deceases when the results of the announcement are known, a GARCH model will
estimate how fast the decay in volatility is.
Unlike traditional event studies which use an estimation window and testing window
to calculate abnormal returns, I use the fitted values of the CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M model
as expected returns. Unexpected returns are then calculated as the actual returns minus
expected returns. This method of not using an estimation window/testing window follows
similarly to that of Cutler et al. (1988) “What Moves Stock Prices?” (which also followed
Roll (1984)) in estimating how much variation in returns can be attributed to news. The
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Table 8: Summary Statistics
Range of Years
1990 to 1994 1995 to 1999 2000 to 2004 2005 to 2009 2010 to 2014 2015 to 2019
Mean Expected Returns by CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M
January -0.00006 0.00052 0.00022 -0.00091 -0.00062 -0.00047
February 0.00040 0.00044 -0.00043 -0.00136 0.00013 0.00060
March -0.00030 0.00007 0.00015 0.00033 0.00078 0.00081
April -0.00053 0.00035 0.00051 0.00075 0.00075 0.00053
May 0.00112 0.00064 0.00017 0.00043 -0.00013 0.00008
June -0.00107 0.00012 0.00031 -0.00070 -0.00060 -0.00017
July 0.00060 0.00006 -0.00090 -0.00045 0.00039 0.00091
August -0.00021 -0.00117 -0.00081 0.00029 -0.00001 -0.00029
September -0.00090 0.00036 -0.00070 -0.00122 0.00005 0.00011
October 0.00017 0.00045 0.00091 -0.00025 0.00005 0.00047
November -0.00025 0.00093 0.00117 0.00019 0.00020 0.00093
December 0.00121 0.00114 0.00066 0.00030 0.00053 -0.00017
Mean Abnormal Returns by Actual - Expected Returns
January 0.00179 0.00072 0.00069 0.00099 0.00058 0.00001
February 0.00120 0.00079 0.00084 0.00072 0.00040 0.00018
March 0.00101 0.00067 0.00091 0.00118 0.00072 0.00081
April 0.00041 0.00089 0.00134 0.00130 0.00065 0.00075
May 0.00055 0.00087 0.00121 0.00097 0.00031 -0.00003
June 0.00052 0.00036 0.00070 0.00071 0.00034 0.00041
July 0.00049 0.00038 0.00049 0.00075 0.00033 0.00000
August 0.00056 0.00063 0.00086 0.00085 0.00036 0.00012
September 0.00076 0.00065 0.00060 0.00057 0.00014 0.00011
October 0.00068 0.00021 0.00049 0.00032 0.00030 0.00008
November 0.00069 0.00035 0.00099 0.00074 0.00001 0.00038
December 0.00094 0.00061 0.00095 0.00133 0.00089 0.00029
Note: Average expected returns and average abnormal returns. Expected returns are calculated as by the CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M model. Abnormal
returns are calculated as actual returns minus expected returns. All numbers are expressed as a rate.
authors relate stock returns to news about macroeconomic performance by first estimating
vector auto-regressive models for the following seven macroeconomic variables: the logarithm
of real dividend payments on the value-weighted New York Stock Exchange portfolio, the
logarithm of industrial production, the logarithm of the real money-supply (M1), the nominal
long-term interest rate (measured as Moody’s AAA corporate bond), the nominal short-term
interest rate (measured as the three-month Treasury Bill), and the logarithm of stock market
volatility. The authors then use the residuals of these models as the unexpected component of
each time series and consider the explanatory power of these “news” measures in regressions
explaining stock returns. They find macroeconomic news can only explain approximately
one-third of the variation in returns.
Table 16 provides an average measure of “normal” activity for firms listed on the S&P
500 between 1990-2019 through expected returns, and abnormal activity through abnormal
returns. Expected returns are calculated from the CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M model specified
in Equations 12 and 13. Abnormal returns are the actual returns minus expected returns.
Average expected returns across firms fluctuate relatively evenly between positive and neg-
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ative values throughout the months and year ranges. In contrast, average abnormal returns
are almost entirely positive throughout the months and across all year ranges. This suggests
big shocks within the U.S financial market result on average in positive accumulated abnor-
mal returns for firms with large market capitalization, regardless of the sign and month of
the shock.
Of course, some months result in a larger accumulation of expected returns and/or abnor-
mal returns than others. Both November and December have the largest average expected
returns during two of the six year ranges33, suggesting firm’s expected returns are on average
larger towards the end of the year34. In contrast, average abnormal returns are accumulated
larger for firms in the beginning and end of the year, but primarily towards the beginning.
April and December have the largest average expected returns during two of the six year
ranges35. More interestingly, for any year range, if average expected returns were larger
towards the end of the year, abnormal returns were accumulated larger for firms towards
the beginning of year and vice versa. It should additionally be noted that the standard
deviation of abnormal returns is extremely large, meaning many firm’s abnormal returns in
the sample vary significantly from the average. This goes to show although all firms in the
sample have very large market capitalization, their abnormal returns can differ significantly
between each other which I believe to be linked to investor’s trading behavior. A detailed
view of the variation in expected returns and abnormal returns between firms can be found
in the Appendix.
3.4 Methods & Results
3.4.1 Asymmetric Effect of Earnings Surprises on Abnormal Returns
I utilize the abnormal returns calculated in Section 3.1 and test the role earnings announce-
ments have on investor behavior in generating these abnormal returns. I do not believe earn-
ings announcements are responsible for the day-to-day fluctuations in stock prices; there is
roughly a coin flip toss a stock price will go up or down on a given day. I do believe,
however, that they play a large role in firm’s accumulation of abnormal returns. To esti-
mate whether investor’s market reactions to earnings surprises are asymmetric I use the two
33November has the largest average expected returns from 2000-2004 and 2015-2019. December has the
largest average expected returns from 1990-1994 and 1995-1999.
34The largest month for average expected returns during 2005-2009 was April, and March for 2010-2014.
35April has the largest average abnormal returns from 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. December has the largest
average abnormal returns from 2005-2009 and 2010-2014. The largest month for average abnormal returns
during 1990-1994 was January, and March for 2015-2019.
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dummy variables described in Section 2 to indicate an earnings beat (forecasted value was
below the realized value) or earnings miss (forecasted value was above the realized value) in
the following fixed effects linear regression:
AbnormalReturnsit = β1mktrfit +β2ESit +β3EABit +β4EAMit +αfirm +θyear + εit (14)
In equation (3), mktrf is the market risk premium. ES represents the earnings season,
which is calculated as the number of firms announcing in a given MonthYear. I control for
the earnings season to control for the large variation that occurs in certain months of each
quarter when a majority of publicly traded companies announce their quarterly earnings.
EAM represents an earnings announcement miss, it is a binary variable that equals 1 if
realized earnings were below the average forecasted earnings and a 0 otherwise. Similarly,
EAB represents earnings announcement beat, it is a binary variable that represents a 1 if
realized earnings were above the average forecasted earnings and a 0 otherwise. αfirm is
a vector of firm fixed effects (by CUSIP). I control for firm fixed effects to control for the
firm specific idiosyncratic error. There may be large average daily returns for some firms
and very small average daily returns for others. Removing the average return of each firm
eliminates this issue and allows us to measure deviation from the average. θyear is a vector
of year fixed effects. It is not entirely clear if abnormal returns increase from year to year
as prices/returns do. Therefore, I provide results both including and excluding year fixed
effects for additional robustness but utilize specification (1) for my analysis. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm level.
Table 9 provides evidence concerning the impact of investor’s asymmetric behavior on
abnormal returns. It compares the market reaction an earnings beat has on abnormal returns
with the market reaction an earnings miss produces on abnormal returns. Although my
calculation of abnormal returns differs, my results are consistent with those found by Ding
et al. (2004); earnings beats or positive earnings surprises are associated with significant
increases in abnormal returns but earnings misses or negative earnings surprises have only
a limited negative impact on returns. An earnings beat, on average, leads to a 0.0017
percentage point increase in daily abnormal returns. The average daily abnormal return
is 0.0005%. This is equivalent to a 340% increase in abnormal returns at the mean. This
effect is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. In contrast, an earnings miss, on
average, leads to a 0.0006 percentage point decrease in daily abnormal returns or equivalently,
a 120% decrease in abnormal returns at the mean. This effect is also statistically significant
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Table 9: Regression Output
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns
(1) (2)
Earnings Beat 0.00167∗∗∗ 0.00165∗∗∗
(0.00008) (0.00008)




Earnings Season 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0005 0.0005
Year FE X
Firm FE X X
Observations 8,243,519 8,243,519
R2 0.00097 0.00122
Adjusted R2 0.00070 0.00094
F Statistic 1,997.11 (df = 8,241,281) 304.928 (df = 8,241,281)
Note: This table summarizes the average effects for earnings surprises. Earnings Beat represents
a 1 if there was an earnings beat on a given date, 0 otherwise. Earnings Miss represents a 1 if
there was an earnings miss on a given date, 0 otherwise. Specification (1) reports average effects
without year fixed effects included. Specification (2) reports average effects with year fixed effects
included. I utilize specification (1) for my analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
at the 1% significance level. While this average effect is still large, it is much smaller to
that of an earnings beat. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) prospect theory demonstrates
the dis-utility of a loss is much greater than the utility of a gain of the same magnitude.
Kahneman and Tversky (1991) found that investors suffer a much greater dis-utility during
a loss and are reluctant to realize their losses during negative earnings surprise. While this
effect holds true, I believe the deeper effects of investor behavior from earnings surprises on
abnormal returns lie within the timing of announcements. In the next section I take this
analysis a step further by seasonally decomposing abnormal returns to test whether investors
react more strongly to positive or negative earnings surprises dependent on the month of
the announcement. Abnormal returns are essential in determining a security’s or portfolio’s
risk-adjusted performance when compared to the overall market or a benchmark index. By
identifying which months experience large variation in stock prices, investors may be able to
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effectively reduce risk on their position.
For an earnings beat, it may be difficult to understand the economic significance of a
0.0017 percentage point change in daily abnormal returns at first, but a simple example can
show the power of this small change. For example, we can think about what would have
happened to Apple’s stock price if they hypothetically had an earnings beat on January 3,
2019. Apple’s closing stock price was $142.19 on that day and had a market capitalization
of approximately $611 billion ($142.19 x 4.3 billion (shares outstanding)). Since an earning
beat on average causes daily abnormal returns to increase by 0.0017 percentage points, an
earnings beat would cause Apple’s stock price to be 0.0017*Pricet−1 or 0.268 higher than
their closing price was on January 3, 2019 without an earnings beat. In terms of company
value this is equivalent to a market capitalization of approximately $612.5 billion ($142.46
x 4.3 billion); a 1.5 billion dollar increase in value from having an earnings beat in a single
day.
3.4.2 Seasonal Effects of Earnings Surprises on Abnormal Returns
After providing evidence investor’s reactions to earnings surprises are asymmetric, I addi-
tionally test whether their reactions are seasonal. That is, are investor’s reactions dependent
on the month of the announcement, leading to larger variation in stock prices during some
months more than others. There is a reason to suspect investor’s reactions to be seasonal
given that negative earnings surprises have limited impact on firms’ abnormal returns. To
test this effect, I interact both an earnings beat (EAB) and earnings miss (EAM) with
month fixed effects in the following fixed effects linear regression:
AbnormalReturnsit = β1mktrfit+β2ESit+β3EAB∗Monthit+β4EAM∗Monthit+αfirm+εit
(15)
I exclude the main effects of an earnings beat and earnings miss in order to observe the
effect of an earnings surprise in all 12 months on abnormal returns without violating perfect
multicollinearity. If I were to include the main effects, I would have to drop a month to not
violate perfect multicollinearity and it is not so clear as to which month should be dropped
to be used as the comparison. It would be necessary to run the model 12 times, excluding
each month at a time and comparing all the effects. To avoid this, I use only the interaction
terms from an earnings miss and beat with month fixed effects. I make note that by including
all the months, I am not able to control for the average monthly effect. Similarly to before,
47
I provide results including and excluding year fixed effects but use specification (1) as my
final model as shown in Equation 15 which excludes year fixed effects.
Table 10 provides evidence concerning the impact of investors’ seasonal reactions to
earnings surprises. I compare the average effect an earnings beat and earnings miss has
on abnormal returns in each month. Investors’ reaction to an earnings beat are extremely
large when announced by firms in June. An earnings beat in June, on average, leads to a
0.0035 percentage point increase in daily abnormal returns, or equivalently, a 700% increase
in abnormal returns at the mean. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% significance
level. In regard to a negative surprise, an earnings miss in December decreases abnormal
returns on average by 0.0022 percentage points. A lot more variation occurs in the month of
December, as indicated by the higher standard error relative to other months; therefore, we
cannot conclude this estimation is significant different from zero. Earnings misses announced
in May, however, have a very similar effect as they do in December, with abnormal returns
decreasing on average by 0.0022 percentage points. At the mean, the effect of an earnings
miss announced in May is equivalent to a 440% decrease in abnormal returns. We can see
again here that although a negative earnings surprise results in a decrease in firms’ accu-
mulation of abnormal returns, it is a limited downside effect across most months. Another
possible explanation for this is that generally investors view the information gain that comes
from an earnings announcement more positively than the actual negative earnings news.
Using a similar example to the one described in Section 3.2, it is possible to see the
extreme differences in the effect an earnings beat can have on abnormal returns depending
on the month of the earnings announcement. For example, I can compare what would have
happened to Apple’s stock price if they had an earnings beat on a random day in June, the
month stock prices suffer the highest variation from earnings beats. We can then compare
this scenario to what would have happened to Apple’s stock price if they had an earnings
beat on a random day in August, a month stock prices suffer extremely low variation from
earnings beats. On June 4, 2019, Apple’s closing stock price was $179.64 and had a market
capitalization of approximately $826.54 billion ($179.64 x 4.6 billion (shares outstanding)).
Since an earning beat in June on average causes abnormal returns to increase by 0.0035
percentage points, an earnings beat would cause Apple’s stock price to be 0.0035*Pricet−1
or 0.61 higher than their closing price was on June 4, 2019 without an earnings beat. In terms
of value this is equivalent to a market capitalization of $829.15 billion ($180.25 x 4.6 billion);
an approximately 2.61 billion dollar increase in daily value from having an earnings beat. In
comparison, an earning beat in August on average causes daily abnormal returns to increase
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Table 10: Regression Output
Dependent variable: Abnormal Returns
(1) (2)


















































Earnings Season 0.00000∗∗∗ 0.00000∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.0005 0.0005
Year FE X
Firm FE X X
Observations 8,243,519 8,243,519
R2 0.00100 0.00123
Adjusted R2 0.00073 0.00095
F Statistic 330.983 (df = 8,241,230) 184.044 (df = 8,241,230)
Note: This table summarizes the average effects for earnings surprises by month. The top portion
above the center line are the average effects for an earnings beat by month. The bottom portion
below the center line are the average effects for an earnings miss by month. Standard Errors
are clustered at the firm level. Specification (1) reports average effects without year fixed effects
included. Specification (2) reports average effects with year fixed effects included. I utilize speci-
fication (1) for my analysis. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.0149
by 0.0007 percentage points. Apple had a closing price of $204.02 and market capitalization
of $922 billion ($204.02 x 4.5 billion (shares outstanding)) on August 2, 2019. Therefore,
an earnings beat on that day would have caused Apple’s stock price to be 0.0007*Pricet−1
or 0.146 higher than their closing price was on August 2, 2019 without an earnings beat.
Apple’s market capitalization with an earnings beat on this day would have been $922.68
billion ($204.17 x 4.6 billion). This is approximately a 0.68 billion dollar increase in Apple’s
daily value; a much smaller increase compared to earnings beats released in a month with
high variation. A similar example can also be down for Apple with a negative earnings
surprise.
4 Conclusion
Earnings announcements have an important effect when a firm experiences an abnormal
stock price movement, largely driven by investor’s behavior to earnings surprises. I provide
evidence that investors’ reactions to asymmetric; investors react stronger on average to
positive earnings surprises than negative earnings surprises. Firms experience on average a
0.0017 percentage point increase in accumulated abnormal returns from having an earnings
beat, whereas an earnings miss has a limited impact on firms with on average a 0.0006
percentage point decrease in accumulated abnormal returns. One possible explanation for
this is that investors are reluctant to realize their losses.
I additionally provide evidence that investor’s reactions to earnings announcements are
seasonal; there exists larger variation in stock prices in some months than others. By season-
ally decomposing abnormal returns, I show investor’s reactions to earnings announcements
extremely differ in magnitude throughout the months of the year. I found investors on
average have the largest reaction to an earnings beat in June and to an earnings miss in
December. On average, an earnings beat in June increases daily abnormal returns by 0.0035
percentage points. An earnings miss in December decreases abnormal returns on average by
0.0022 percentage points.
Identifying which months stock prices experience larger variation from earnings surprises
has some implications for the investment strategies of investors. During these high volatility
months, investors can utilize financial derivatives such as options which provide insurance
on their position. For example, a call option allows an investor to sell their stock at a
specific price by a given date. The call option would allow an investor to sell their stock at
a previously agreed upon price regardless if the stock price drops during one of these highly
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volatile months. This means the investor is protected from any downside risk during the
time the option is effective. It is well known earnings season there exists a lot of volatility;
many stocks exceed their earnings estimates and experience a big jump in price, and several
others fall short of their estimates and sustain a big price drop. However, it should be noted
higher volatility means higher option prices. My findings allow for investors to identify which
months are worth purchasing that additional insurance on their position than others.
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5 Appendix
American versus European style Options
We find the need to distinguish American and European style options. Our paper utilizes
options chains on SPY, which is traded American style. The BSM assumptions are meant
for pricing and characterizing the underlying asset in the form of European style options,
where the holder of the option can exercise only at expiration. For American style options,
the holder can exercise at an point in time. This presents a contrasting difference in pricing
an option, where American style options are greater than or equal to the price of European.
However, the BSM can approximate American options fairly close to European. The same
underlying assumptions regarding the volatility smile and distributional assumptions still
hold in this analysis by implementing the BSM on SPY. Our focus is to estimate parameters
in the model, specifically N(d2) from the original BSM framework, rather than observing
price differences, which may lead to biased results, from American and European call options
Geske and Roll (1984).
Implied Volatility from Dataset
Our analysis utilizes data from IVolatility.com on SPY options contracts, which provides
estimates on the BSM inputs of implied volatility, time to maturity, option price, strike, and
spot price (or closing price of SPY). We clarify here the use of implied volatility, which is
provided by our data source for every strike in an options chain. IVolatility applies the Cox,
Ross and Rubenstein method (CRR) to estimate implied volatility of SPY using a binomial
tree of 100 steps. The method of CRR is applied primarily due to early exercise ability of
SPY options, and dividend component. Dividends expected to paid on the underlying asset
cause the price to drop, and may affect the early exercise of the option. To adjust for the
early exercise component, the CRR approach provides a better estimate of implied volatility
than the BSM framework.
Implied BSM versus Implied Monte Carlo
In addition to testing the forecasting accuracy of BSM, we run a Monte Carlo simulation
with 1,000,000 iterations to observe a simulated path of risk adjusted probabilities. The
simulated Monet Carlo options pricing model is the same as Black-Scholes with the exception
that one measure of volatility is used (average of past 180-days) in comparison to BSM which
uses the forecasted volatility (implied volatility). Figure 7 displays the implied CDF from a
Monte Carlo simulation for all unique option expiration dates 180 days to expiration. We
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simulate the price path of SPY using the market price at 180 days prior to expiration, and






Here, r̄f is the risk free rate, d is the dividend yield of SPY, σ is the constant volatility, z
is random normal variable with mean zero and standard deviation of one, and t is the time
step of the price path. We then bin the simulated price path using strike prices in the options
chain, and create an empirical distribution of risk adjusted probabilities. We find that the
Monte Carlo simulation results in a similar time path and shift of risk adjusted probabilities
as we see in Figure 2. Over time and closer to expiration, there is less probability of deep out-
of-the money options being exercised. Such an observation suggests that high uncertainty
about the overall price path of SPY gives way to a more uniform distribution of N(d2) closer
to maturity. This is consistent with the results we saw in Figure 2; much of the uncertainty
can be attributed to implied volatility from the BSM overestimating the risk attributed to
deep in and out-the money contracts. The probability mass of the tails decreases as an
options chain approaches expiration, suggesting traders have a much more clearer picture as
to which strikes are likely to remain in-the-money at expiration.
Figure 7: Monte Carlo Simulation of Risk Adjusted Probabilities
Note: A Monte Carlo simulation applied on 1,000,000 iterations for 180 days to expiration.
The plot uses the same expiration dates as that of Figure 2 , and simulates the price
path of SPY 180 days to expiration. The price path is then binned by the
same strike prices given in Figure 2 for a call option. A more detailed look of
the Monte Carlo simulated implied cumulative distribution can be seen.
Observing Figure 7, we can see how well the simulated Monte Carlo model predicts the
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underlying price path of SPY furthest from expiration. The simulated Monte Carlo model,
in comparison to BSM, assigns less weight to the tails of the distribution; resulting in a
more S-shaped curve farther out from expiration. Implied volatility for deep in and out of
the-money accounts for this difference, since we assume a constant volatility for the Monte
Carlo simulation. With a greater number of iterations, the resulting Monte Carlo simulation
converges to the implied distribution of the BSM in Figure 2.
Figure 8: In Depth Summary Results for 180 DTE
Note: Implied BSM distribution and actual distribution tested under the K-S (top two
sub-figures) and A-D (bottom two sub-figures) test for each unique expiration date across
180 days to expiration. The blue and red colors mean the null hypothesis was rejected on
that day, meaning the two distributions do not come from the same underlying population
distribution. The green and yellow colors mean we failed to reject the null hypothesis
on a given day, meaning the two distributions are from the same underlying population
distribution.
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Figure 9: In Depth Summary Results for 90 DTE
Note: Implied BSM distribution and actual distribution tested under the K-S (top two
sub-figures) and A-D (bottom two sub-figures) test for each unique expiration date across
90 days to expiration. The blue and red colors mean the null hypothesis was rejected on
that day, meaning the two distributions do not come from the same underlying population
distribution. The green and yellow colors mean we failed to reject the null hypothesis
on a given day, meaning the two distributions are from the same underlying population
distribution.
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Figure 10: In Depth Summary Results for 60 DTE
Note: Implied BSM distribution and actual distribution tested under the K-S (top two
sub-figures) and A-D (bottom two sub-figures) test for each unique expiration date across
60 days to expiration. The blue and red colors mean the null hypothesis was rejected on
that day, meaning the two distributions do not come from the same underlying population
distribution. The green and yellow colors mean we failed to reject the null hypothesis
on a given day, meaning the two distributions are from the same underlying population
distribution.
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Figure 11: Sample Vega Surface
Note: The above plot displays a vega surface for a call options chain that expires on 2005-12-
16 from our sample SPY data. Vega tends to peak ATM, and is much lower as the options
approaches expiration.
Figure 12: Sample IV Surface for Calls
Note: A sample implied volatility surface is displayed above, provided by a sample of data
that expires on 2012-10-05. The surface incorporates the term structure and volatility smile
of call options data. For out of the-money options, the implied volatility peaks. The term
structure portion shows that implied volatility peaks for short dated options, as opposed to
options with a longer time to maturity.
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Table 10: Average Implied Volatility Differential for Call Options
Range of Moneyness K/S0
Year [,0.85) [0.85,0.95) [0.95,1.05) [1.05,1.15) [1.15,)
2005 0.2497 0.0933 0.0073 0.0109 0.0302
2006 0.3307 0.0998 0.0079 0.0019 0.0180
2007 0.3575 0.0981 0.0061 -0.0260 -0.0001
2008 0.3795 0.0856 0.0026 -0.0354 0.0033
2009 0.3195 0.0965 0.0050 -0.0261 0.1070
2010 0.2875 0.1051 0.0077 -0.0249 0.0565
2011 0.3024 0.1036 0.0087 -0.0280 0.0295
2012 0.3062 0.1096 0.0112 -0.0169 0.0715
2013 0.3029 0.1221 0.0159 -0.0026 0.0727
2014 0.3249 0.1270 0.0138 -0.0129 0.0810
2015 0.3112 0.1245 0.0081 -0.0281 0.0533
2016 0.3213 0.1264 0.0114 -0.0126 0.1130
2017 0.3949 0.1395 0.0219 0.0081 0.0914
2018 0.4336 0.1287 0.0137 -0.0057 0.0886
2019 0.4248 0.1250 0.0132 -0.0192 0.0866
2020 0.3662 0.1430 0.0116 -0.0366 -0.0298
Note: The table summarizes the mean implied volatility differential. We do so by subtracting
implied volatility for each contract in a call options chain by the ATM contract (contract
with moneyness closest to 1). We calculate the average based on a range of moneyness,
alowing us to observe how volatility changes across options that are ITM, ATM, and OTM.
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Table 11: Average Implied Volatility Differential for Put Options
Range of Moneyness K/S0
Year [,0.85) [0.85,0.95) [0.95,1.05) [1.05,1.15) [1.15,)
2005 0.2419 0.0861 0.0071 0.0357 0.1133
2006 0.2887 0.0902 0.0075 0.0286 0.1469
2007 0.2866 0.0844 0.0054 -0.0089 0.0720
2008 0.2619 0.0640 0.0026 -0.0240 0.0429
2009 0.2244 0.0728 0.0045 -0.0158 0.1290
2010 0.2092 0.0821 0.0072 -0.0132 0.0777
2011 0.2268 0.0823 0.0083 -0.0157 0.0426
2012 0.2104 0.0808 0.0099 -0.0012 0.0812
2013 0.1884 0.0960 0.0151 0.0162 0.0903
2014 0.2061 0.0986 0.0136 0.0018 0.0891
2015 0.2207 0.0930 0.0094 -0.0128 0.1015
2016 0.2232 0.1014 0.0122 0.0034 0.1516
2017 0.2871 0.1227 0.0237 0.0375 0.1171
2018 0.3380 0.1202 0.0157 0.0091 0.1389
2019 0.3485 0.1100 0.0162 0.0006 0.1368
2020 0.3450 0.1333 0.0133 -0.0361 -0.0230
Note: The table summarizes the mean implied volatility differential. We do so by subtracting
implied volatility for each contract in a put options chain by the ATM contract (contract
with moneyness closest to 1). We calculate the average based on a range of moneyness,
alowing us to observe how volatility changes across options that are ITM, ATM, and OTM.
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Table 12: Mean of Options Greeks by Moneyness Range
(a) Call Options
Range of Moneyness K/S0
[,0.85) [0.85,0.95) [0.95,1.05) [1.05,1.15) [1.15,)
delta 0.9479 0.8694 0.4818 0.0722 0.0299
vega 0.0901 0.1733 0.2210 0.1038 0.0487
gamma 0.0027 0.0100 0.0358 0.0088 0.0031
theta -0.0240 -0.0502 -0.0953 -0.0219 -0.0161
rho 0.2543 0.2397 0.1190 0.0336 0.0122
(b) Put Options
Range of Moneyness K/S0
[,0.85) [0.85,0.95) [0.95,1.05) [1.05,1.15) [1.15,)
delta -0.0224 -0.0992 -0.4783 -0.8950 -0.9570
vega 0.0463 0.1424 0.2281 0.1431 0.0595
gamma 0.0016 0.0087 0.0375 0.0116 0.0038
theta -0.0134 -0.0434 -0.1081 -0.0538 -0.0466
rho -0.0137 -0.0492 -0.1192 -0.2507 -0.3364
Note: We present summary statistics for the Greeks for call and put options separately.
From 2005 to 2020, we take the mean of each options Greeks within a range of moneyness.
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Figure 13: Timeline of SPF Forecasts
Note: SPF forecasts for one to six quarters out were made at t0 for each security’s yield.
Forecast error, or ε, is defined as the actual yield minus the average forecasted yield at each
quarterly projection.
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Three-Month Treasury Bill SPF Forecast Error
Three-Month Treasury Bill
Quarters Ahead Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
1 -0.093 0.948 -0.381 0.376
2 -0.128 0.988 -0.472 0.374
3 -0.240 1.169 -0.801 0.433
4 -0.407 1.414 -1.056 0.502
5 -0.567 1.590 -1.427 0.441
6 -0.732 1.709 -1.901 0.347
Note: SPF forecast error from 1980 Q4 to 2018 Q3 for the three-month Treasury bill.
Forecast error is displayed for projections made 1-6 quarters ahead of time. Forecasts are
the average of all unique forecasts for a given quarter. Forecast error is actual yield minus
the average forecasted yield made one quarter ahead of time. All numbers are expressed as
a rate.
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond SPF Forecast Error
Moody’s AAA Corporate Bond
Quarters Ahead Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
1 NA NA NA NA
2 -0.192 0.600 -0.513 0.165
3 -0.303 0.741 -0.665 0.027
4 -0.433 0.866 -0.787 -0.042
5 -0.563 0.943 -0.931 -0.184
6 -0.696 0.975 -1.111 -0.203
Note: SPF forecast error from 1983 Q1 to 2018 Q3 for Moody’s AAA corporate bond.
Forecast error is displayed for projections made 2-6 quarters ahead of time. Forecasts are
the average of all unique forecasts for a given quarter. Forecast error is actual yield minus
the average forecasted yield made one quarter ahead of time. All numbers are expressed as
a rate.
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Treasury Note SPF Forecast Error
Ten-Year Treasury Note
Quarters Ahead Mean SD 1st Q 3rd Q
1 -0.096 0.573 -0.443 0.286
2 -0.170 0.631 -0.581 0.216
3 -0.305 0.730 -0.833 0.089
4 -0.446 0.814 -1.047 0.032
5 -0.579 0.840 -1.107 -0.128
6 -0.705 0.836 -1.267 -0.188
Note: SPF forecast error from 1980 Q4 to 2018 Q3 for the ten-year Treasury note. Forecast
error is displayed for projections made 1-6 quarters ahead of time. Forecasts are the average
of all unique forecasts for a given quarter. Forecast error is actual yield minus the average
forecasted yield made one quarter ahead of time. All numbers are expressed as a rate.
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Table 16: Summary Statistics
Range of Years
1990 to 1994 1995 to 1999 2000 to 2004 2005 to 2009 2010 to 2014 2015 to 2019
SD of Expected Returns by CAPM-GARCH(1,1)-M
January 0.00718 0.00787 0.01128 0.01336 0.01081 0.01098
February 0.00740 0.00783 0.00941 0.01149 0.01056 0.01116
March 0.00579 0.00706 0.01163 0.01525 0.01226 0.01134
April 0.00754 0.00801 0.01245 0.01325 0.00997 0.00932
May 0.00583 0.00711 0.01031 0.01100 0.01031 0.00948
June 0.00565 0.00691 0.00895 0.00999 0.01051 0.00976
July 0.00523 0.00741 0.01184 0.01251 0.00985 0.00789
August 0.00795 0.01006 0.01122 0.01055 0.01254 0.01172
September 0.00589 0.00947 0.01244 0.01487 0.01340 0.00966
October 0.00724 0.01078 0.01348 0.01959 0.01824 0.01063
November 0.00695 0.00738 0.00951 0.01655 0.01591 0.00933
December 0.00530 0.00714 0.00968 0.01316 0.01204 0.00998
SD of Abnormal Returns by Actual - Expected Returns
January 0.02872 0.02919 0.03149 0.03053 0.02376 0.02327
February 0.02853 0.02789 0.02865 0.02778 0.02295 0.02384
March 0.02677 0.02744 0.02998 0.02987 0.02284 0.02264
April 0.02844 0.02985 0.03171 0.03002 0.02327 0.02213
May 0.02603 0.02650 0.02739 0.02943 0.02533 0.02444
June 0.02669 0.02701 0.02803 0.02537 0.01985 0.01894
July 0.02670 0.02755 0.02949 0.02818 0.02254 0.02062
August 0.02683 0.02722 0.02723 0.02558 0.02296 0.02210
September 0.02672 0.02834 0.02916 0.02689 0.02156 0.01902
October 0.02856 0.03078 0.03211 0.03223 0.02731 0.02192
November 0.02708 0.02863 0.02869 0.02922 0.02572 0.02283
December 0.03173 0.03221 0.03027 0.02800 0.02327 0.01951
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